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PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS UNDER THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974
Peter H Turza* and Lorraine Halloway**
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) I was
signed into law, appropriately, on Labor Day of that year. Many people
considered the Act to be the most significant social legislation since the
passage of the Social Security Act in 1935.2 Others labeled ERISA
a "monster ' 3 and called for its immediate repeal or redrafting. The Act
was criticized by those who believed it went too far in providing unneces-
sary regulation, as well as by those who felt it did not go far enough
4
in curing those problems of employee pension 5 and welfare
* B.A., Yale University, 1971; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1974. Mr.
Turza is currently serving as special counsel to Senator Jacob K. Javits (R.-N.Y.) for Em-
ployee Benefits.
** Columbus School of Law, Catholic University, Class of 1979.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 to 1381 (1976)
and in scatterd sections of IRC) [hereinafter referred to as ERISA or the Act]. For helpful
summaries and discussions of ERISA's substantive provisions, see S. GOLDBERG, PENSION
PLANS UNDER ERISA (1976); E. MILLER, PENSION REFORM ACT OF '74 (1974); Comment,
The Employee Retirement Income Securifty Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 539 (1975).
2. The Social Security Act of 1935, Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.). Senator Javits, one of ERISA's principal co-authors, heralded the Act as the
"greatest development in the life of the American worker since Social Security." 120 CONG.
REC. S15,742 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974).
Javits was joined in this view by President Ford and others. See N. LEVIN, ERISA AND
LABOR-MANAGEMENT BENEFIT FUNDS 8 (2d ed. rev. 1975). See also 120 CONG. REC.
S15,758 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen); 120 CONG. REC. H8698 (daily
ed. Aug. 20, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi); 120 CONG. REC. H8702 (daily ed. Aug. 20,
1974) (remarks of Rep. Ullman).
3. N. LEVIN, supra note 2, at 8. The Act was also branded as "cruel and misleading
bunk." Bernstein, Labor, Financial Interests Sank Pension Reform, Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Sept. 21, 1974, § B, at 5, col. 1. Consumer-advocate Ralph Nader reportedly found the Act a
"terrible disappointment." 120 CONG. REC. H8700 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974) (remarks of
Rep. Dent).
4. N. LEVIN, supra note 2, at 8.
5. ERISA defines an employee pension benefit plan as:
any plan, fund, or program which heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent
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plans6 which it addressed. 7
ERISA is intended to protect working men and women against abuses
related to employee benefit plans8 and to improve the equitable nature and
soundness of such plans. In furtherance of these goals, Title I of ERISA,
that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan,
fund, or program-
(A) provides retirement income to employees, or
(B) results in deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termi-
nation of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calcu-
lating the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating benefits
under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976).
The assets of a pension plan are generally held in trust by one or more trustees. Contribu-
tions may be made to the plan or trust by the employer, by the employee, or by both. Pen-
sion plans may be employer-initiated or set up pursuant to the terms of a collective-
bargaining agreement. See Comment, supra note 1, at 541 n.2. In 1972, approximately one-
third of all private pension plans were negotiated and 25 percent of these plans accepted
employee contributions. Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, Protecting a Potential Pensioner's
Pension-An Overview of Present and Proposed Law on Trustees' Fiduciary Obligations and
Vesting, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 521, 526 (1974) (citing statistics from BNA PERSONNEL POL-
ICIEs FORUM, SURVEY No. 103, PENSION & OTHER RETIREMENT BENFITS 5 (1973)).
6. ERISA describes the objectives of an employee welfare benefit plan as:
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of in-
surance or otherwise,
(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits,
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship
funds, or prepaid legal services ....
ERISA § 3(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1976). They may also include "any benefit de-
scribed in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions upon retirement or death and
insurance to provide such pensions)." ERISA § 3(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(I)(B) (1976).
Benefits described in § 186(c) include payments for medical or hospital care, compensation
for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activities, and accident insurance. 29
U.SC. § 186(c) (1976).
In 1970, welfare plans covering hospitalization numbered about 150,000 and those cover-
ing surgery numbered about 138,000. Eighty percent of the population had health or hospi-
talization and surgical coverage, and millions of pensioners enjoyed ancillary health
benefits. N. LEVIN, supra note 2, at 18-19. For statistics on prepaid legal services plans, see
notes 238-41 infra.
7. Although ERISA covers employee welfare plans as well as (but not to the same
extent as) pension plans, Congress' primary concern was regulating the pension field, and
much commentary on ERISA continues the emphasis on pension plans. See, e.g., Com-
ment, supra note 1; Note, The Pension Reform Act of 1974: Brave New World of Retirement
Security, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 1044 (1975). Historically, there has been more interest in and
regulation of pension plans than welfare plans. See Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Employee Le-
gal Service Plans- Conflicts Between Federal and State Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 787, 790 nn.l I & 12. Most of the material in the congressional hearings and
reports leading to passage of ERISA concerned pension plans. Id. at n.21.
8. ERISA defines the term "employee benefit plan" as "an employee welfare benefit
plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare
benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3)
(1976).
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administered and enforced by the Secretary of Labor, sets forth a five-part
regulatory scheme. Part one establishes reporting and disclosure require-
ments for all employee benefit plans subject to the Act. 9 Parts two and
three apply only to pension plans and establish minimum standards in
areas such as participation, vesting, benefit accrual and funding.' 0 Part
four, applicable to welfare and pension plans alike, establishes standards
and specific prohibitions governing the conduct of plan fiduciaries."I Part
five contains a broad scheme for public and private enforcement of Title
1.12 Part five also contains ERISA's preemption provisions. 13
Several considerations influenced the Congress to enact ERISA. First
was the enormous growth in the size, scope, and number of employee ben-
efit plans.' 4 Second, Congress noted the increasingly interstate nature of
the plans' operations and economic impact, as well as the effect of the se-
curity of such plans on millions of employees and their families, thereby
9. ERISA §§ 101 to 111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021 to 1031 (1976).
10. Id. at §§ 201 to 306, 29 U.S.C. at §§ 1051 to 1086.
11. Id. at §§401 to 414, 29 U.S.C. at §§1101 to 1114.
12. Id. at §§ 501 to 514, 29 U.S.C. at §§ 1311 to 1144.
13. Id. at § 514, 29 U.S.C. at § 1144. This section provides for the preemption of all
state laws "insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any [ERISA-covered] employee
benefit plan." A qualified exception to the broad ERISA preemption is made for state laws
regulating insurance, banking, or securities. Id. See text accompanying notes 69-89 infra
for a more detailed discussion of ERISA's preemption provision.
Other titles of ERISA include: Title II (ERISA §§ 1001 to 2008) which amends the Inter-
nal Revenue Code relating to retirement plans; Title III (ERISA §§ 3001 to 3043, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1201 to 1242), which addresses jurisdiction, administration and enforcement under ER-
ISA, sets up the Joint Pension Task Force, and establishes the Joint Board for Enrollment of
Actuaries; and Title IV (ERISA §§ 4001 to 4082, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301 to 1348), which estab-
fishes the plan termination insurance program administered by the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation.
14. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976). The extraordinary rate of growth of pen-
sion plans alone is charted below:
MILLIONS OF BILLIONS OF
EMPLOYEES DOLLARS






Comment, supra note 1, at 542 (using Dep't of Labor Figures appearing in SUBCOMM. ON
LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, INTERIM REPORT OF
ACTIVITIES OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN STUDY, S. REP. No. 634, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1971) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 92-634] and 120 CONG. REC.
S16,552 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1974) (Dep't of Labor Summary of ERISA)).
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creating a "national public interest" in such plans. 15 Moreover, despite the
importance of employee benefit plans to American labor relations, Con-
gress found an absence of adequate safeguards governing plan establish-
ment, administration, and termination. 16 Inadequate funding and overly
stringent eligibility provisions had resulted in the loss of anticipated retire-
ment benefits by thousands of employees who had long service records.17
These concerns did not surface overnight. Government study of the em-
ployee benefit field dates back to 1962, when President John F. Kennedy
appointed a special cabinet-level task force to study the reasons for lost
employee benefits and to assess the resulting impact on the economy. 18
Although the task force noted the ineffectiveness of current federal legisla-
tion,' 9 it was not until 1967 that concrete legislation on the subject was
introduced in Congress.
20
Passage of comprehensive pension reform legislation, however, did not
come until 1974, when the Senate and House adopted differing versions of
ERISA.2  Originally, both bills contained limited preemption provisions,
15. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976).
16. See text accompanying notes 32-54 infra (describing the inadequacy of federal safe-
guards), and text accompanying notes 55-68 infra (describing the inadequacy of state regu-
lation). See also H. R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4641-43 [hereinafter cited as H. R. REP. No. 93-533], S. REP. No.
92-634, supra note 14, at 23-27.
17. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976). For example in 1964, the Studebaker
plant in South Bend, Indiana was closed, its employees were discharged, and the corpora-
tion's pension plan was terminated. More than 4,000 participants between ages 40 and 60
lost $14 million, or 85% of the current value of their vested benefits. Workers under age 40
lost an unspecified amount of vested increases. This highly publicized case underscored the
need for regulation of pension plans. See Chadwick & Foster, Federal Regulation of Retire-
ment Plans: The Quest for Parity, 28 VAND. L. REV. 641, 668-69 & n.196 (1975).
18. See 120 CONG. REC. S 15,743 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Javits).
See also S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4843-44 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 93-127].
19. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER RETIRE-
MENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS-A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS (1965) (commonly
known as the Wirtz Report). See S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 18, at 7, [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4843-44. Other Executive Branch activities which contributed to
passage of ERISA included the 1971 White House Conference on Aging and the work of a
Special Task Force of the Secretary or Health, Education and Welfare (leading to publica-
tion of a report in December 1972 entitled "Work in America"). Id.
20. S. 1103, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 4647 (1967) was introduced by Sena-
tor Javits and contained comprehensive reforms for private pension and welfare plans.
Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation under ERISA, 62 IOWA L.
REV. 57, 59 (1976).
21. Brummond, supra note 20, at 59. The Senate version of what became ERISA was
passed on September 19, 1973, and the House version was passed five months later. Id. at
59-60. After six weeks of intensive discussion, debate and redrafting in the Conference
Committee, differences between the two versions were resolved. Chadwick & Foster, supra
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superseding only that state regulation of subject matter expressly covered
in each version. 22 In response to organized labor's concern over state regu-
lation of prepaid legal services plans and both business' and organized la-
bor's concern about the increasing state regulation of interstate plans,
however, the conference committee on the legislation expanded ERISA's
preemptive effect. Accordingly, the broad preemption language finally
adopted by Congress in 1974 provides for the displacement of all state
laws, with certain exceptions, relating to pension and welfare plans. 23 This
approach was hailed as more consistent with congressional intent that
ERISA's requirements replace inadequate and conflicting state standards
for pension and welfare plans.
24
note 17, at 669. See the Conference Report on ERISA, H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5038.
22. There was no real conflict between the two narrowly focused preemption provisions
originally adopted by the House and the Senate. Compare H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 699(a) (1974) (as amended by the Senate):
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS-It is hereby declared to be the express intent
of Congress that, except for actions authorized by section 694 of this title, the pro-
visions of this Act. . . shall supersede any and all laws of the States and ofpolitical
subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the subject matters
regulated by this Act. . . except that nothing herein shall be construed-
(1) to exempt or relieve any employee benefit plan not subject to this Act...
from any law of any State;
(2) to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities. . . or
(3) to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the
United States other than the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act or any rule
or regulation issued under any law except as specifically provided in this Act. (em-
phasis added)
with H.R. 12906, 93d Cong, 2d Sess., § 514 (1974):
(a) It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that, except for ac-
tions authorized by section 503(e)(l)(B) of this Act and except as provided in sub-
section (b) of this section, the provisions of part I of this subtitle shall supersede any
and all laws ofthe States and ofpolitical subdipisions thereof insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to the reporting and disclosure responsibilities, and fiduciary re-
sponsibilities, ofpersons acting on behalfofany employee benefit plan to which part 1
applies. (emphasis added)
23. The language of ERISA's preemption provisions is discussed in text accompanying
notes 90-95 infra. The provision is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
24. Senator Javits explained why Congress rejected the selective approach to preemp-
tion:
[Preemption defined in relation to the specific areas regulated in the Act] raised the
possibility of endless litigation over the validity of State action that might impinge
on Federal regulation, as well as opening the door to multiple and potentially con-
flicting State laws hastily contrived to deal with some particular aspect of private
welfare or pension benefit plans not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory
scheme.
Although the desirability of further regulation-at either the State or Federal
level-undoubtedly warrants further attention, on balance, the emergence of a
comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniformity with
Catholic University Law Review
As commentators correctly predicted, however, a myriad of unanswered
questions about ERISA's preemption language were left to the courts.
2 5
Recent decisions and commentary on the preemption language 26 have
heightened the uncertainty in important areas of state concern. Regulation
of health care plans, provision of legal services, division of property upon
divorce, protection of workers from discrimination, and imposition of
taxes on welfare plans have all been affected by ERISA. Although there is
still strong support for Congress' choice of broad preemption,2 7 a signifi-
cant number of critics now argue that Congress' initial ap-
proach-favoring narrow preemption-may have been the wiser course.
28
As a result, just five years after ERISA's passage, six bills have been intro-
duced into Congress to amend and narrow the preemption provision.
29
This article will survey the problems caused by ERISA's present pre-
respect to interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-the displacement
of State action in the field of private employee benefit programs.
120 CONG. REC. 29942 (1974).
25. See, e.g., note 24 supra; Brummond, supra note 20, at 65; Pensions Land in Divorce
Court, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 1977, at 108.
26. Early critical attention was directed toward the procedural requirements of ERISA.
Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 789 n.9. However, more recent commentary and
debate has focused on the preemption problem. In addition to the Pfennigstorf & Kimball
article discussing preemption and legal service plans, see generally Brummond, supra note
20 (discussing preemption as it relates to insurance regulation); Pattiz, In a Divorce or Disso-
lution W*ho Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, 5 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 191, 230-41 (1978) (discussing preemption of community property laws);
Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefts After Mar-
riage of Brown and ERJSA, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 417, 511-27 (1978); Comment, ERISA and
the Preemption of State Law, 6 FORDHAM U. L.J. 599 (1978); Hutchinson, Preemption Under
ERISA and State Spousal Rights, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 8, 1979, at 22. The Subcommittee on
Labor Standards of the House Committee on Education and Labor held a day of hearings
on the preemption issue on June 1, 1978 and the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources addressed the issue in hearings on February 6-8, 1979.
27. See Oversight on ERISA, 1978. Hearings Be/ore the Subcommittee on Labor Stand-
ards of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 535 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Oversight Hearings] (statement of the ERISA Industry Committee
(ERIC)).
28. See, e.g., id. at 677 (statement of National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC)). The NAIC statement also contains a list of court decisions and other litigation
involving ERISA. Id. at 680-82.
29. The following were introduced in the 95th Congress but did not pass: H.R. 6944,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H4119 (daily ed. May 5, 1977) (introduced by Rep.
Heftel); S. 1383, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S6393 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1977)
(introduced by Sen. Inouye); S. 2018, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S13734 (daily
ed. Aug. 4, 1977) (introduced by Sen. Curtis); H.R. 13446, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG.
REc. H6585 (daily ed. July 12, 1977) (introduced by Rep. Seiberling). See text accompany-
ing notes 285-89 infra. Currently, two bills are pending in the 96th Congress. S. 209, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S557 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979) (introduced by Senators
Javits &. Williams); H.R. 1884, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H456 (daily ed. Feb.
5, 1979) (introduced by Representative Seiberling).
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emption provision, focusing on judicial interpretations30 as well as possible
legislative solutions.
31
I. FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION: SEEDS OF CONFLICT
A. Federal Regulation Prior to ERISA
Pension and welfare benefit plans are relatively recent developments,
first appearing in this country during the nineteenth century.32 Legislation
affecting such plans has generally encouraged their growth. 33 The first law
30. See text accompanying notes 99-282 infra.
31. See text accompanying notes 283-326 infra. This article does not discuss in any
detail preemption of securities laws. ERISA's saving clause, § 514(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1 144(b)(l)(A) (1976), includes state securities laws. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979), the
Seventh Circuit held that an employee's interest in an involuntary, noncontributory, collec-
tively-bargained pension plan was a security and that the failure to disclose certain plan
provisions to the plaintiff gave rise to a cause of action under the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act do not apply to a non-
contributory, compulsory pension plan. 47 U.S.L.W. at 4140. Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, stated that in light of ERISA's comprehensive regulation of pension plans, the
Seventh Circuit's extension of the Securities Acts to cover pensions "serves no useful pur-
pose." Id. at 4139. The ERISA Improvements Act of 1979, introduced by Senators Javits
and Williams, would render state and federal securities laws inapplicable to a participant's
interest in voluntary, contributory, defined contribution plans. S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 154 (1979). Questions have now been raised as to whether state common law fraud actions
are preempted by ERISA and how ERISA relates to state securities law regulations affecting
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). See ESOP Council Says Requiring a Permit to
Issue Employer Securities Could Ha veAdverse Affect, BNA PENSION REP., Aug. 21, 1978, at
A-7. Other ERISA preemption questions not addressed in detail by this article include: the
statute's effect on state banking laws, see, e.g., Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson, 439 F. Supp.
252 (D.R.I. 1977) (upholding state regulation of a bank under ERISA's saving clause for
state statutes regulating banking) and the extent to which ERISA's nonalienation provision
precludes enforcement of state money judgments, see, e.g., National Bank v. IBEW, Local
No. 3., BNA PENSION REP., Jan. 23, 1978, at A-21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 1977).
32. The first pension plan in the United States was established in 1818 for veterans of
the War of 1812. N. LEVIN, supra note 2, at 13. The first private pension plan was estab-
lished by the American Express Company in 1875, and the second private pension plan, that
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, followed in 1880. E. ALLEN, J. MELONE, &
J. ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING 1 (3d ed. 1976).
Welfare plans developed more informally as employers occasionally paid health and hos-
pital bills for their workers. About 1910, insurance companies started to sell group coverage
for life, accident and sickness, and temporary disability. N. LEVIN, supra note 2, at 15.
Although by 1920 there were almost 250 private pension plans, welfare plans did not
begin to mushroom until the 1930's when Blue Cross and Blue Shield were developed. Id.
at 14-15.
33. The tax, labor-management and other federal statutes mentioned in this article are
discussed at greater length in Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, supra note 5, at 53448. See also
Chadwick & Foster, supra note 17, at 642-668.
19791
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dealing with employee benefits, the Revenue Act of 192 1,34 provided a tax
exemption for earnings and contributions to profit-sharing or stock bonus
trusts, encouraging more employers to establish those plans. Favorable tax
treatment was extended to contributions to pension funds in 1926.
35
Although generous tax laws fostered the growth of private pension
plans, 36 they also provided fertile ground for corporate abuses. 37 Congress
reacted to these abuses in 1942 by restricting tax preferences to plans that
met statutory standards.38 This measure, while correcting some of the
structural inequities 'in the employee benefit plans, did not treat the serious
problems of mismanagement which had developed in the absence of any
other state and federal regulation.39 It was not until after World War II
that Congress passed the first of three major remedial measures regulating
this aspect of pension and welfare plans. The first of these laws, the La-
bor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 4° attempted to eliminate
the extortion, bribery and mismanagement plaguing union pension and
34. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219 (f), 42 Stat. 247 (1921) (current version at IRC
§§ 402 to 403)
35. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 219(0, 44 Stat. 33-34 (1926) (current version at IRC
§§ 401 to 402). See J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAX, 1938-1861, 604-05 (1938). Three main tax breaks were given for all such funds until
1942: employers could deduct their contributions when made; income earned on accumu-
lated contributions was exempt from taxation; and employees' tax liability for amounts con-
tributed arose only when the benefits were received after retirement, generally resulting in
the application of lower tax rates. Note, supra note 7, at 1051. Regulation of pension plans
through the tax laws has been more substantial than has been regulation of other benefit
plans. Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 790 n.12.
36. Note, supra note 7, at 1051. Other factors generating growth of pension and welfare
plans include the New Deal's emphasis on social/welfare programs, the passage of Social
Security and the wage freeze during World War II which forced employers to seek other
fringe benefits. N. LEVIN, upra note 2, at 15. In 1940, assets of pension plans alone totaled
$2.4 billion. See note 14 supra.
37. For example, high-ranking corporate officials often set up tax deductible plans for
themselves and barred other employees from participation. See 88 CONG. REC. 6378 (1942)
(remarks of Rep. Disney).
38. The amendments required employee benefit trusts to either cover at least 70% of all
employees with five years of service or cover employees according to classifications which
did not discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders, supervisors, or other highly compen-
sated employees. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 862 (1942) (current version
at I.R.C. § 401). See J. SEIDMAN, supra note 35, at 2099-104.
39. By the mid-1940's welfare and pension plan trusts contained large amounts of un-
regulated funds, most of which were at least partly controlled by labor unions whose prac-
tices were coming under congressional scrutiny. There were no guidelines for establishment
and operation of plans administered jointly by management and unions and hence little to
prevent employer contributions from becoming disguised payoffs to union officials. Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 636. See Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, supra note 5, at 534-48, for an
excellent discussion of pre-ERISA regulation of pensions.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 to 188 (1976).
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welfare funds by strictly controlling their establishment and operation.4'
Although the LMRA was a significant first step by Congress toward im-
posing administrative and fiduciary duties upon trustees of welfare and
pension funds,42 those interested in misusing these funds soon found ways
to circumvent the Act and continued to mismanage money intended for
the plans' participants and beneficiaries. 43 In an effort to close those loop-
holes, Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (LMRDA)," which imposed additional fiduciary require-
ments on labor union officers and others with access to plan funds or prop-
erty.4
5
By this time, approximately 84 million Americans relied on benefits
from welfare and pension funds, 46 and pension abuses became a matter of
tremendous concern. Senate investigations of the corrupt practices con-
nected with welfare and pension funds47 led to enactment of a third piece
of remedial legislation, the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of
41. See Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, supra note 5, at 535-41. Congress became con-
cerned that union officials might convert the already vast resources of welfare and pension
plans to their own use rather than for the intended beneficiaries of the trusts. This concern
was stimulated by the abuses revealed during the United Mine Workers' strike of 1946 and
the resultant federal takeover of the mines. Id. See also H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE
WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 564-66 (1950). The LMRA made it illegal to set up a
pension plan administered solely by a union. Union officials could only participate in the
management of such funds as members of a board of trustees on which both labor and
management are equally represented. Moreover such trust funds could only be established
for the exclusive benefit of employees and their dependents. See LMRA § 302(c)(5), 29
U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1976).
42. Landau, Merholtz, & Perkins, supra note 5, at 541.
43. Id. Under LMRA, there were no rules or enforcement machinery to guarantee that
agreements establishing the plans were sound, fair and equitable, nor was there any assur-
ance that beneficiaries would receive all the benefits to which they were entitled. Pfennig-
storf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 791. Other shortcomings of the LMRA are discussed in
Landau, Merholtz, & Perkins, supra note 5, at 536-41; and Comment, supra note 1, at 637-
39.
44. 29 U.S.C. §§401 to 531 (1976).
45. The new act made it a federal offense to deal with union funds in a manner inimical
to the interests of union members as a group. See 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1976). See also Landau,
Merholtz, & Perkins, supra note 5, at 541-44.
46. Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, supra note 5, at 544. The federal courts had given
impetus to the growth of pension plans in the late forties by ruling that employers must
bargain with unions on pensions. Inland Steel v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
47. See Second Senate Report on Employer Welfare Funds, 36 L.R.R.M. 213, 213-14
(1955); Role of the Federal Government in Labor Relations, McClellan Committee Reports on
1957 Activities, 41 L.R.R.M. 54, 60 (1957). Congress heard numerous complaints of kick-
backs from insurance companies and other interested parties, excessive commissions, and
similar acts antagonistic to beneficiaries' interests. Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at
791 & n.19.
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1959 (WPPDA).48 This Act required disclosure of information relating to
employee benefit plan operations to participants and beneficiaries. 49 The
WPPDA required plans to submit names and other information regarding
plan administrators and trustees to the Department of Labor, and to dis-
close schedules of benefits, sources of financing, and fiscal management
matters.50 Larger plans had to comply with more extensive requirements,
including annual disclosures of assets, salaries paid, employer contribu-
tions, as well as liabilities, the number of employees covered, and the
amount of benefits paid.5 1 In 1962, after the WPPDA's reliance on private
enforcement had proven ineffective, Congress amended the Act to author-
ize the Secretary of Labor to write regulations, conduct inquiries, and seek
injunctions against violators.
52
The LMRA, the LMRDA, and the WPPDA established fiduciary as
well as reporting and disclosure standards, thus making it more difficult
for individuals to loot welfare and pension funds.53 The laws were limited
in their scope and effectiveness, however, and they did not address all of
the problems which afflicted employee benefit plans.
54
B. State Regulation Prior to ERISA
If pre-ERISA federal regulation of pension and welfare plans was less
than satisfactory, state regulation of the field was virtually nonexistent.55
48. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed by ERISA § 111, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1031(a)(1) (1976)).
49. WPPDA only applied to pension plans with over 25 participants. Pub. L. No. 85-
836, § 4(b), 72 Stat. 998 (1958). Additionally, only plans with 100 or more participants were
required to file annual reports. Pub. L. No. 85-836, § 7, 72 Stat. 1000 (1958), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 87-420, § 9(a), 76 Stat. 36 (1962). President Eisenhower described the WPPDA
as an act which "establishes a precedent of Federal responsibility in this area ... but...
does little else." E. PATTERSON, LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PENSION EXPECTATIONS
99 (1960).
50. WPPDA, Pub. L. No. 85-836, § 6(b), 72 Stat. 999 (1958) (repealed by ERISA § Ill,
29 U.S.C. § 103(a)(l) (1976)).
51. Id. at § 6, as amended by Pub. L. No. 87-420, § 9(a), 76 Stat. 36 (1962).
52. Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 36 (1962) (repealed by ERISA). Pfennigstorf & Kim-
ball, supra note 7, at 791. For more detail on the WPPDA's provisions see generally
Blakely, Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962, 38 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 263 (1963); Note, The Welfare And Pension Plan Disclosure Act-Its History, Operation
& Amendment, 30 GEO. WASH. L. Rlv. 682 (1962).
53. See Landau, Meholtz & Perkins, supra note 5, at 545-46.
54. Id. at 562. The pre-ERISA laws did not protect participants if they did not receive
payment due to underfunding, termination of the plan, or insolvency of the sponsor. Nor
did they require any systematic disclosures to participants. See H. REP. No. 93-533, supra
note 16, at 3-5.
55. For more detailed discussions of state regulation in this area, see E. PATTERSON,
supra note 49, at 188-215; Pfennigstorf& Kimball, supra note 7, at 792-96; Goetz, Regulation
of Uninsured Employee Welfare Benet Plans Under State Insurance Laws, 1967 Wis. L.
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It was not until 1955 that the public outcry against mismanagement and
corruption produced the first state statute expressly regulating the field. 56
Within three years, five additional states enacted similar laws.57 State reg-
ulatory legislation generally was limited to plans entered into pursuant to
collective bargaining agreements 58 and any application to plans covering
beneficiaries outside the state was restricted.
Direct legislation of pension and welfare plans, however, was not the
only approach taken by states to regulate the field. Some states attempted
to bring employee benefit plans under existing legislation by characterizing
plans as insurers or insurance companies.59 States had special reasons for
adopting this approach. Many employers found it cheaper to insure em-
ployees through a welfare and pension fund than through traditional in-
surance policies.60 Accordingly, these self-insurance schemes threatened a
major source of state revenue, state insurance premium taxes.61
In spite of this threat, only a few state insurance commissioners took
affirmative regulatory action against employee benefit plans. 62 Those who
did, however, sometimes took extreme measures. In State ex rel Farmer v.
REV. 319; Comment, State Regulation of Noninsured Employee Welfare Beneft Plans, 62
GEO. L.J. 339 (1973).
56. Ch. 8, 1955 Wash. Laws 1745 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.52.010 to
48.52.080 (1974)) (covering maintenance and inspection of plan records). All six states
which subsequently passed "disclosure" laws did so in reaction to revelations of reckless and
selfish actions on the part of fiduciaries. Although these examples of wrongdoing all in-
volved life, health, and accident insurance benefits, the resulting legislation also covered
pension plans. E. PArTERSON, supra note 49, at 188. Conversely, the abuses cited in legisla-
tive hearings leading to enactment of ERISA centered primarily on those concerning pen-
sion plans. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 92-634, supra note 14.
57. See ch. 774, 1956 N.Y. Laws 1690 (codified in N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 60 to 75 and
N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 37 to 379 (McKinney 1971)). In New York, administrative jurisdiction
over plans with corporate trustees was vested in the Superintendent of Banking and all other
plans were supervised by the Superintendent of Insurance. The New York model was fol-
lowed by: California, see ch. 2167, 1957 Cal. Stats. 3841 (expiring under its own terms on
June 30, 1960 and also explicitly repealed by ch. 409, 1965 Cal. Stats. 1725); Connecticut, see
ch. 594, 1957 Conn. Pub. Acts 918 (repealed); Massachusetts, see ch. 655, 1958 Mass. Acts
572 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 151D, §§ I to 18 (West 1971 & Supp.
1978-79); Wisconsin, see ch. 552, 1957 Wis. Laws 742 (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 211.01 to 211.17 (West Supp. 1977-78)).
58. Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 793.
59. Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 796.
60. Id. at 795-96. It is, of course, possible for pension and welfare funds to purchase
group insurance and annuity policies for employees, but this alternative has become attrac-
tive only recently. See E. ALLEN, J. MELONE, & J. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 32, at 156.
61. See Comment, supra note 55, at 343 & n.24.
62. See Goetz, supra note 56, at 321 n.4. See generally Melone, Are Non-Insured Pen-
sion Plans Engaged in the Business of Insurance, 30 J. INS. 505 (1963). Arkansas and Mis-
souri were two of the few states which did take such action. See Casenote, 28 ARK. L. REV.
515, 519 (1975). See also Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New York State Tax Comm'r, 32 N.Y.2d
348, 345 N.Y.S.2d 475, 298 N.E.2d 632 (1973).
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Monsanto Co. ,63 the Missouri Insurance Department sought an injunction
against a self-insured plan, 64 alleging that Monsanto was conducting the
business of insurance without a license and thus illegally depriving the
state of premium taxes.65 The lower court agreed with state officials and
not only enjoined operation of the plan, but also assessed severe penalties
against the corporation totalling $185 million.66 The Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed the decision a year later, finding that Monsanto-type
plans, which were not marketed commercially, did not constitute an "in-
surance business" as contemplated by Missouri law. 67 However, the pre-
posterous assessment of penalties by the lower court, as well as the lack of
judgment shown by state officials bringing the suit, generated opposition to
state regulation and support for federal standards among both labor and
management.
68
II. THE ERISA PREEMPTION PROBLEM
A. General Preemption Princples
The potential for preemption problems exists whenever the federal gov-
ernment and state governments regulate the same field or enact legislation
affecting the same spheres. 69 With the minimal regulation existing prior to
ERISA's passage, preemption of state pension and welfare benefit laws
was not a serious problem.7 0 Because of its comprehensive nature, how-
63. 517 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1974).
64. The plan provided medical, surgical, hospital, and temporary disability benefits. It
began in 1964 and was a minimal premium arrangement whereby Monsanto paid all welfare
benefits up to a specified amount with the balance insured by a commercial carrier. Between
1964 and 1971, the carrier had paid no benefits, but Monsanto had paid out over $114 mil-
lion. Comment, supra note 55, at 345.
65. 517 S.W.2d at 130.
66. Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 796 (citing State v. Monsanto Co., No.
259774 (St. Louis County Cir. Ct. Jan 4, 1973)).
67. 517 S.W.2d at 132-33.
68. See Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 796. For criticism of the circuit court's
decision, see Comment, supra note 55, at 346-51. The $114 million in benefits paid out by
Monsanto may have produced a loss in revenue to Missouri of $2.3 million between 1967
and 1971. See Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 796 n.49.
69. Preemption problems mainly arise when a state law becomes unenforceable because
of a clash with a federal law. Examples include state laws which command conduct prohib-
ited by federal law, and state regulation of a field which Congress has subjected to federal
governance. See Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 515,
516.
70. Nevertheless, as soon as the first state statutes regulating pension and welfare plans
were passed, the possibility of conflict with federal legislation had been considered. See
Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 793-94. See also Goetz, supra note 55, at 329, 330,




ever, ERISA impacted on a wide segment of state law, ranging from tax
and insurance to trusts and banking, and also including securities and
criminal law, thus increasing the likelihood of eventual conflict.
The case law on the subject of preemption employs several conflicting
tests to determine if a state law is preempted. 71 The two most commonly-
used standards for determining whether a state statute unconstitutionally
obstructs "the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of an Act of Congress, '72 and is thereby preempted, are: first,
whether the state law conflicts or interferes with the federal law; and sec-
ond, whether the federal law occupies the field.73 Under the conflict or
interference test, a court construes both the state and federal statutes at
issue and then decides whether actual conflict exists.74 The clearest con-
flict cases are those in which either the federal law mandates action forbid-
den by the state law, or the state law calls for action clearly prohibited by
federal law. 75 The existence of conflict becomes more difficult to detect,
however, as state interference with the federal legislation decreases. 76
71. The Supreme Court and scholars alike have recognized-the confusion generated by
the cases. See Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DEPAUL L.
REV. 630, 631-32 (1972). In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), the Court observed:
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in light of ... federal laws
touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting;
contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsis-
tency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions pro-
vides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In
the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula.
312 U.S. at 67. For additional analysis of the preemption issue, see Hirsch, supra note 69;
Note, The Preemption Doctrine.- Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975) (noting that the Supreme Court has taken a seemingly ad hoc
and unprincipled approach to preemption cases and analyzing the Burger Court approach).
72. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
73. Note, ppra note 71, at 624. See also Hirsch, supra note 69, at 526-33. Although
Hirsch separates the conflict and interference standard into two distinct categories, he notes
that the Supreme Court has used the two tests interchangeably. Id. at 528 & n.59.
74. Note, supra note 71, at 626. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644-56
(1971) (involving state restrictions on automobile negligence judgment debtors and federal
regulation of bankruptcy); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 541-44 (1945) (in-
volving state union registration requirements and NLRB regulation of unions).
75. See, e.g., Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954) (federal law per-
mitting national banks to receive "savings deposits" and to advertise for business precluded
enforcement of New York law prohibiting banks from using the word "savings" in adver-
tisements because enforcement of the state statute would interfere with the banks' attraction
of depositors).
76. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (conflict between federal regula-
tion of bankruptcy and state limitations on automobile negligence judgment debtors); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (federal maritime safety re-
quirements and municipal pollution regulation). The most difficult cases are those involving
federal and state statutes applying to entirely different subject matter but meeting at a com-
mon point. See Note, supra note 71, at 626 n.22.
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Under the second test for preemption-occupying the field-a court fo-
cuses primarily on the scope of the federal law, and looks at the state law
only to determine whether it falls within these boundaries. 77 If a court
finds that federal law occupies the field on a given subject, state law regu-
lating that subject will be displaced, regardless of whether the state regula-
tion impairs operation of the federal law. 78 Occasionally courts begin their
analysis in a preemption case without categorizing the case, thereby failing
to articulate the standard employed.
Regardless of the test used, however, the Supreme Court has articulated
subsidiary guidelines for deciding when state laws should be preempted.
79
In all cases, the Court looks for evidence of congressional intent to pre-
empt. If the federal statute does not expressly bar state regulation or is
silent with respect to preemption, other factors may be examined. 80 The
Court has outlined several methods for ascertaining whether Congress has
evinced a "clear" and "manifest" intent to override state law. For exam-
ple, the scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive that it would be
reasonable to infer Congress left no room for the states to supplement it;
likewise, the federal act may touch a field in which federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude state en-
forcement on the same subject. Additionally, the object sought to be ob-
tained by federal law and the nature of the obligations imposed could
reveal a purpose to preclude state enforcement on the same subject, or the
state policy may produce results which would be inconsistent with the fed-
eral objective. 8'
77. Hirsch, supra note 69, at 529.
78. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (Federal Tobacco Inspection Act
preempted state statute requiring type labelling of tobacco held for auction); Hines v. David-
owitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (federal statute requiring registration of resident aliens with federal
authorities precluded enforcement of state alien registration law); New York Cent. R.R. v.
Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) (FELA precluded enforcement of nonconflicting state work-
men's compensation remedies).
79. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1958).
80. These factors were articulated in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218. 230
(1947), in which the court considered amendments to the U.S. Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 241 to 273 (1976). Although the original act made federal regulation of warehouses and
warehousemen subservient to state regulation, the amendments called for exclusive federal
regulation. 331 U.S. at 222-23, 233. The court stated that when a federal statute is amended
to eliminate dual regulation in order to achieve "fair and uniform business practices," the
test was whether the matter on which the state asserts the right to act is in any way regulated
by the federal act. Id. at 236.
81. Id. at 230. The Court cited Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S.
566, 569 (1919) and Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) for the first
method; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) for the second; several cases, including
New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) for the third; and Hill v. Florida ex
rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) for the fourth.
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Most preemption cases have involved federal statutes with no clear ex-
pression of the intent to preempt.82 Even in cases involving statutes con-
taining express preemption or savings provisions, however, courts still
must determine how much state law is to be affected by the specific lan-
guage.
83
In deciding preemption cases, the Burger Court has embraced the con-
cept of accommodation and complementary state/federal regulation. 84 At
least one observer has suggested that the current Court will permit poten-
tially conflicting state legislation to stand when Congress has not made
clear its intent to preempt or when the conflict is peripheral to the purpose
of the federal law.85 Recent decisions support that assessment. In Jones v.
Rath Packing Company,86 the Court reiterated the principle that when the
field is one traditionally occupied by the states, the courts should assume
that those "historic police powers . . . were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'87
Similarly, in De Canas v. Bica,88 the Court asserted that state regulation
consistent with federal laws in an area would be permitted unless it could
be shown that the "complete ouster of state power was . . . the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."
'89
82. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Florida Lime & Avocado Grow-
ers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). See generally Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at
799 & n.64.
83. See Hirsch, supra note 69, at 538-49. It is unrealistic to assume that Congress, in
enacting a general preemption or saving clause, actually considered all possible state laws
touching on a particular state-regulated field. Therefore, when Congress expresses or im-
plies an intention concerning preemption, the proper application of that intention calls for
judicial inquiry into the state laws considered by Congress as grounds for that intention. Id.
at 540-41.
84. See. e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 135
(1973) (upholding a state law found to be peripheral to the federal act's main purpose); New
York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423 n.29 (1973) (to merit judicial
resolution rather than cooperative federal-state resolution, conflicts should be of substance).
85. Note, supra note 71, at 653.
86. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
87. Id. at 525 (quoting from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Accord, Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 272 (1977). In Jones, however, the
Court found the challenged California weight-labelling statutes preempted by: 1) the express
supersession clause of the Wholesome Meat Act since the state laws varied from the federal
standard; and 2) the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, because although the federal act did
not expressly supersede the state law, enforcement of the state law interfered with the federal
act's purpose. See 430 U.S. at 530, 543.
88. 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (finding no preemption by the Immigration and Nationality Act
of that portion of the California Labor Code prohibiting employers from knowingly em-
ploying aliens not entitled to lawful residence in the U.S. if such employment would ad-
versely affect lawful resident workers).
89. Id. at 357.
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B. ERISA's Preemption Provisions
Unlike the many statutes which are silent as to their preemptive effect,
ERISA's section 51490 expressly indicates congressional intent to occupy
the employee benefit plan field and thereby displace a large part of state
regulation affecting employee benefit plans.
The general preemptive language of section 514(a) provides that ERISA
shall supersede "any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereaf-
ter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA.9 1 State laws
regulating insurance, banking and securities are saved from preemption.
92
The savings clause is modified, however, by the so-called "deemer clause"
which provides that an employee benefit plan shall not "be deemed to be
an insurance company. . . or to be engaged in the business of insurance
. . . for purposes of state laws purporting to regulate insurance companies
[or] insurance contracts. ' 93 For purposes of the general preemption sec-
tion, ERISA defines state law to include "all laws, decisions, rules, regula-
tions, or other state action having the effect of law."' 94 As used in this
section, the term "state" includes "a state, any political division thereof, or
any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, di-
rectly or indirectly, the terms and conditions" of ERISA-covered plans.95
The legislative history of the preemption provision has generated some
confusion on the subject. Although congressional remarks generally de-
scribe the preemption provisions as sweeping in scope,96 statements by cer-
90. The preemption provisions of ERISA are codified at 29 U.S.C. § I 144(a)-(d) (1976).
Section 1144(d) provides that ERISA does not supersede federal laws.
91. Excluded from ERISA coverage are governmental and most church plans, plans
maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensation
laws, unemployement compensation laws or disability insurance laws, plans maintained
outside of the U.S. mainly for the benefit of nonresident aliens, and unfunded excess benefit
plans. ERISA § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1976).
92. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1976).
93. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976). The section also specifies
that benefit plans shall not be considered banks or investment companies either.
94. ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1976).
95. ERISA § 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1976).
96. Congressman Dent noted "the crowning achievement of [ERISA], [is] the reserva-
tion to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans.
With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded participants by elimi-
nating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." 120 CONG. REC.
29197 (1974). See also the following remarks of Sen. Williams:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the sub-
stantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to
preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting
or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle
is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local govern-
ments or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of law. Consis-
tent with this principle, State professional associations acting under the guise of
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tain members of Congress indicate that there is room for some state
regulation which touches upon an employee benefit plan under specific
state statutes.97 Additionally, there is no evidence that Congress consid-
ered the full impact of preemption on a variety of state laws which do not
directly regulate employee benefit plans, but whose enforcement affects the
form, content, or operation of such plans. 98 Hence, although the plain lan-
guage of the statute indicates congressional intention to occupy the em-
ployee benefit plan field, the legislative history of ERISA is not conclusive
in discerning the outer limits of that field.
III. ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE STATUTES IMPACTING ON
EMPLOYEE PENSION BENEFIT PLANS
A. State Employee Bene/it Plan Laws
One of the earliest court decisions interpreting the reach of ERISA's
preemption provision was Azzaro v. Harnett,99 a case involving state at-
tempts to regulate pension plans directly. In Azzaro, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that ERISA
completely occupies or preempts the field of employee benefit plans and
therefore prohibits state efforts to supervise them.l°° The state supervision
at issue in Azzaro consisted of requests for information made by the New
York Department of Insurance about the pension benefit status of a pen-
sion plan participant. 0 1 The plaintiffs refused to supply the information,
claiming that the state's jurisdiction had been displaced by that of the
United States Department of Labor pursuant to ERISA section 514.102
State-enforced professional regulation, should not be able to prevent unions and
employers from maintaining the types of employee benefit programs which Con-
gress has authorized-for example, prepaid legal services programs.
120 CONG. REC. 29933 (1974).
97. For example, there are extensive remarks on ERISA's preemptive effect on state bar
rules. See text accompanying notes 250-51 infra. These remarks indicate that although state
law cannot dictate the form of prepaid legal services plans, states may regulate the conduct
of lawyers participating in the plans. Id. However, no guidelines for drawing the line on
preemption are provided.
98. An example of such state laws are anti-discrimination statutes. See text accompa-
nying notes 256-82 infra.
99. 414 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a ffd without written opinion, 553 F.2d 93 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
100. 414 F. Supp. at 474.
101. Id. at 473. The suit was brought by the trustees of Bakery Drivers Local 802. Pen-
sion Fund who sought to enjoin inquiries by the state superintendent of insurance into the
present pension benefit status of a plan participant. They also sought a declaration of their
rights and obligations with respect to state efforts to supervise their plan. Id.
102. Id. at 473-74. When plaintiffs first challenged the basis of the department's jurisdic-
tion, state officials asserted that there was no supersession under ERISA because most of the
participant's pension credits were earned prior to the January 1, 1975, effective date of ER-
19791
Catholic University Law Review
Relying on the legislative history of the 1974 Act, the court held that Con-
gress intended to preempt absolutely the employee benefit plan field.'
0 3
The court saw the purpose of this preemption as the uniform regulation of
such plans and found that ERISA provides full protection in the area of
employee benefit plans.' °4 The court narrowly construed the section
514(b)(1) savings clause, in order to avoid creating "a chaotic condition" in
the preempted field, thereby violating ERISA's purpose.' 05 In this man-
ner, the court limited permissible state regulation to controversies existing
prior to ERISA regarding employee benefit plans.'°6
B. Marital Property and Support Laws
Although most of the ERISA preemption litigation since Azzaro has in-
volved welfare plans, 10 7 an increasing number of cases have focused on
state court divorce and support orders relating to pension benefits. States
traditionally have exercised control over and provided the primary protec-
tion for the family.' 0 8 State statutes determine, for example, the age at
ISA. Plaintiffs contended this reasoning would lead to perpetual control of their plan by the
State Insurance Department, resulting in their subjection to concurrent state and federal
regulation. Id. at 474.
103. The court cited Senator Williams' introduction to the conference report. See note
96 supra. The court also cited House report language stressing the interstate nature of em-
ployee benefit plans. See 414 F. Supp. at 474.
104. 414 F. Supp. at 475. While this may be true of pension plans, it is questionable with
respect to employee welfare plans.
105. 414 F. Supp. at 475.
106. Id.
107. See text accompanying notes 136-282 infra.
108. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) in which the Court stated: "The
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife. . . belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States."
It is important to recognize that the Supreme Court generally permits federal preemption
of marital property and support laws only if Congress has with "force and clarity" unmis-
takenly ordered state law to yield. See Reppy, supra note 26, at 483. The reluctance of the
courts to infer congressional intent to subject such state laws to federal rules can be ex-
plained, at least in part, by the fact that there is no developed federal system to fill the void if
state law is not applied. Id. at 484. Professor Reppy points out that the absence of a federal
marital property law has led the Court to find no preemption even where the state rule
directly frustrated a strong federal interest. In United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966),
the federal government sued the wife after a couple had defaulted on a government loan.
The wife claimed that under Texas law her power to bind her separate property was limited.
Despite the fact that legislation creating the Small Business Administration provided that
federal law of capacity to contract was to govern such transactions, the Court upheld the
wife's defense. In doing so, the Court held that state family law rules "should be overridden
by federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the National Government,
which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major
damage if the state law is applied." Id. at 352. See Reppy, supra note 26, at 484-85. In
Yazell, the Court found "no 'federal interest' which justifies invading the peculiarly local
jurisdiction of these States . . .and of the subtleties reflected by the differences in the laws
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which one may marry and the grounds for divorce. The state courts deter-
mine how property should be divided when a marriage ends. Until re-
cently, it was rare that the value of a future pension was considered in a
divorce settlement. 0 9 There is a growing awareness, however, that the
pension due the working member of a couple is one of the richest assets a
husband and wife possess. In our debt-financed society, the pension is fre-
quently the only significant asset of the family which is not mortgaged." 0
Accordingly, it has become increasingly common for divorce settlements to
allocate a share of the pension to the nonworking spouse. " ' I Courts in two
community property states have held already that the spouse of a pension
plan participant has a community interest in the payments received upon
retirement." 2 Those states also extended community property status to
nonvested pension interests in 1976.113
Most of the litigation concerning ERISA preemption of marital property
of the various states which generally reflect important and carefully evolved state arrange-
ments designed to serve multiple purposes." 382 U.S. at 353. Arguably the federal interest
in uniform pension standards embodied in ERISA would justify such an intrusion into an
admittedly state domain.
Of particular significance to the issue of preemption of marital property and support laws
is the Supreme Court's recent declaration in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977),
that when a federal statute affects an area traditionally regulated by the states, no preemp-
tion will be presumed and the burden will be on the party claiming preemption to prove
clearly and plainly that Congress intended to preempt. See text accompanying notes 86-87
supra.
109. Pensions Land in Divorce Court, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 1977, at 104. See also Thiede,
The Community Property Interests of the Non-Employee Spouse in Private Employee Retire-
ment Benefits, 9 U.S. FAM. L. REV. 635 (1975).
110. Pensions Land in Divorce Court, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 1977, at 104. The house, a
couple's major asset, is usually subject to a mortgage.
11I. Even as recently as five years ago, the value of a future pension was rarely consid-
ered in divorce settlements unless one spouse was a high corporate executive with prospects
of a six-figure retirement income. Today, however, pensions are routinely considered "as
part of the kitty subject to distribution." Id.
112. The two states are Texas and California. The law governing existence of marital
property rights in retirement benefits is rapidly developing, especially in community prop-
erty states. See Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. 1977); In re Marriage of
Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976) (listing additional cases);
French v. French, 17 Cal.2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941) (overruled in Brown). The California
Supreme Court upheld a malpractice verdict of $100,000 against a divorce attorney who had
failed in 1967-68 to assert community property interests in a military pension on behalf of
his client, the wife. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal.3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
In a strong dissent, Judge Clark pointed out the uncertainty of this area of the law in 1967-
68. Id. at 369-70, 530 P.2d at 602-06, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35 (1975).
113. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561, 569 n.14, 126
Cal. Rptr. 553, 641 n.14 (1976). Accord, Clearly v. Clearly, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
However, California's "terminable interest rule," which limits the rights of the non-
participant spouse to pension interest received during the joint lives of the divorcing part-
ners, has been severely criticized and is not followed in other community property states
such as Texas and Louisiana. See Pattiz, supra note 26, at 207.
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and support laws has centered on two specific provisions of the federal
statute:" 4 section 206(d)(1),15 which states that a pension plan "shall pro-
vide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alien-
ated;" '1 6 and section 514(a), which generally preempts all state laws
relating to employee benefit plans, without exempting domestic relations
laws. 17 The cases involving these statutory sections emerge from a variety
of factual situations and claims for relief. A nonemployee spouse may as-
sert community or common law property rights. The right to support may
114. For detailed discussions of other facets to this problem, see Reppy, supra note 26;
Pattiz, supra note 26. Although most of the litigation on this issue has arisen in the commu-
nity property states of California and Texas, the preemption issue is also a problem in com-
mon law property states and involves state support orders as well as orders dividing marital
property upon divorce. See, e.g., Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc. 2d 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929
(Sup. Ct. 1978) (involving state order for alimony payments).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976). The Internal Revenue Code has a parallel provision
at IRC § 401(a)(13).
116. Anti-assignment or spend-thrift clauses of similar scope are included in laws regu-
lating military benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1976), Railroad Retirement benefits, 45 U.S.C.
§ 231m (Supp. V 1975), and Civil Service benefits, 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (1976). Some state court
decisions have held that these clauses do not preempt state law and the argument has been
made that the anti-assignment clause in ERISA should have no greater effect. See Reppy,
supra note 26, at 516. But see Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (provision in Na-
tional Service Life Insurance Act that proceeds of policy go to named beneficiary preempts
community property law entitling spouse to one-half proceeds of policy). Reppy distin-
guishes the anti-assignment clause involved in Wissner on the basis of its breadth and the
fact it was tied to a provision empowering servicemen to name beneficiaries of federally-
created National Service Life Insurance (NSLI) Act proceeds. Reppy, supra note 26, at 516
n.350. A recent federal district court decision rejected the distinction between the NSLI and
ERISA anti-assignment clauses and relied on Wissner in finding that ERISA prohibits in-
voluntary transfers, including those resulting from California community property laws.
See Francis v. United Tech. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The Supreme Court
recently considered the relation between anti-assignment clauses and community property
settlements and barred the assignment of Railroad Retirement Act benefits pursuant to a
California divorce decree in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 47 U.S.L.W. 4141 (U.S. Jan. 23,
1979).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976). Among the other sections raising potential preemption
problems for marital property and support laws are § 3(6) and (7) of ERISA, which define,
respectively, "employee" and "participant" as the person who is working for the employer
providing the pension plan, with no reference to the person's spouse. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) &
(7) (1976). Only an employee may participate in the qualified plan. Therefore an attempt to
enroll the spouse as a participant violates ERISA. In addition § 3(8) of ERISA, defines
"beneficiary" as "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee bene-
fit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1976).
ERISA does not mention the extent of benefits the designee may receive or the circum-
stances under which he or she is entitled to benefits. Commentators have taken the view that
since ERISA is silent on the extent to which a beneficiary may take under the plan, there is
no term or condition of an ERISA-covered plan with which a state law on the subject can
conflict. See Reppy, supra note 26, at 517-527. See also Comment, The Relationship of




be asserted by a nonemployee spouse or other dependent. The plan par-
ticipant may be currently employed, retired or deceased. The employee
spouse's interest may be vested or forfeitable, or may be in pay status or a
future expectancy. Suit may be filed against the plan, employer, union,
insurance carrier, or plan administrator. In each case, however, a court
order must be sought requiring the plan or the other defendant to pay
benefits directly to the nonemployee spouse or other dependent in satisfac-
tion of that individual's right to family support or marital property.
Questions have therefore arisen concerning the state courts' authority to
order direct payment of plan benefits to the participant's former spouse or
other dependents upon divorce, and whether payments made by a trustee
pursuant to a state court decree would either breach a fiduciary obligation,
or cause the plan to lose its tax-exempt status." 8 Alternatively, should a
trustee fail to make the payment, arguably such an action could be in con-
tempt of court.
In view of the competing interests, it would be easy to envision a split
between state and federal courts on the preemption issue. State courts
would be expected to uphold local court divisions of property despite ER-
ISA, and federal courts would be presumed to uphold preemption of these
same state actions. State courts have fulfilled this expectation,1 9 but the
federal courts that have considered the issue have not ruled uniformly. A
118. The anti-alienation requirement is a condition of tax qualification under I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(13). Several consequences flow from a plan's loss of qualified tax exempt status: (1)
contributions made under I.R.C. § 404 would no longer be deductible by the employer; (2)
any earnings of the plan's trust would be taxable immediately to the trust; and, (3) of more
immediate consequence to the plan participant, all employer contributions to the plan would
be taxable to the participant as wages. Brief for Defendant in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, at 19, Francis v. United Tech. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
119. The state courts have uniformly found ERISA no bar to their direction that a pen-
sion plan pay benefits to the nonemployee spouse. See, e.g., Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc.
2d 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (ERISA anti-assignment section does not bar wife
as an alimony creditor). The Cogollos court directed the National Maritime Union to de-
duct $100 per month from the pension due a husband who had defaulted on his support
payments. The pension plan sought reargument to consider the effect of ERISA on the
ruling, maintaining that compliance with the court's order might constitute an assignment or
alienation in violation of the federal act and thus subject the plan to possible loss of its tax
exempt status. Relying on state precedent rejecting a similar argument with regard to the
New York pension statute, N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1971), the
court refused to hold that ERISA protects a spouse from his or her familial support obliga-
tions. There being no conflict between state and federal law the court found no preemption
of the support decree by ERISA. Other state cases upholding enforcement of support judg-
ments against an employee's pension benefits or direct deduction of support payments from
such benefits include Johnston v. Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978)
(distribution of community property); Biles v. Biles, 394 A.2d 153 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1978) (enforcement of alimony order); Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 93 Misc.2d 784, 401
N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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federal case typifying a broad preemptive approach is Kerbow v.
Kerbow,120 in which the employer, General Motors Corp., had refused to
honor the judgment of the state domestic relations court and did not pay
or withhold for the plaintiff-spouses any of the employee-spouses' accrued
pension payments. The case had been removed to federal court but was
remanded because the district court found that it lacked jurisdiction over
the claim. 121 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that plaintiffs,
who were nonemployee spouses, were neither participants nor benefi-
ciaries entitled to bring suit under ERISA, and that the state divorce de-
cree did not alter the terms of the plan to make plaintiffs beneficiaries, but
merely gave them a right to any money their defendant husbands might
receive from the plan. The court declared that Congress intended ERISA
"to supersede any and all state laws regulating employee benefit plans," so
that any cause of action against the corporation under the terms of the
pension plan would be barred by the federal court decision.1 22
In Stone v. Stone,123 however, a federal district court presented with a
similar fact pattern reached the opposite conclusion on the issue of pre-
emption. Considering the same jurisdictional question at issue in Kerbow,
the court stated that a nonemployee spouse with a colorable interest in
pension plan benefits must be able to sue the plan to enforce that interest
in order to prevent the loss of a remedy for any wrongful failure by plan
120. 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
121. Id. at 1259.
122. Id. at 1260. See also General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, No. 6-72159, slip op. at 6
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 1976). In Townsend, the court granted plaintiff's request for a perma-
nent injunction against a divorce court's writ of garnishment of a pension plan because the
state garnishment law conflicted with and was preempted by ERISA's restriction on aliena-
tion and assignment of benefits. See ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976). The
court refused, however, to find the state law superseded under § 514(a).
123. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21,
1978). In Stone, a California divorce decree had awarded the nonemployee wife direct pay-
ment of a share of her former husband's pension. The pension plan filed a petition for
removal; the parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the fed-
eral district court granted judgment against the plan, remanding the wife's action against her
husband to state court. 450 F. Supp. at 920.
The court in Stone declined to follow the holding of the earlier decision of In re Marriage
of Pardee, 408 F. Supp. 66 (C.D. Cal. 1976), in which another federal court had taken a less
well-reasoned and stronger stand against preemption of community property laws by
ERISA. In Pardee, Judge Ferguson expressed doubt that ERISA supersedes community
property laws, warning that if courts find such preemptive intent in ERISA "the federal
judiciary will have been granted a roving commission to delineate family property law with
little assistance from the Congress as to how to proceed." Id. at 669. Concluding that there
was no separate and independent cause of action upon which to base federal jurisdiction,
Judge Ferguson declined to decide "[w]hether the Congress has introduced such a system of
legalized chaos" into an area "so traditionally the preserve of the states." Id.
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trustees to pay benefits.' 24 In its analysis, the court weighed the two pre-
emption theories under which ERISA might invalidate a state divorce de-
cree. First, it considered the decree's conflict with the anti-assignment and
anti-alienability provisions of section 206(d)(1).' 25 Emphasizing the tradi-
tional state dominion over domestic relations law, the court cited examples
of judicial reluctance to intervene in this area.' 26 Finding that section
206(d)(1) neither explicitly prohibited transferring pension benefits under
state community property laws nor prevented the inclusion of such a trans-
fer in the plain meaning of "assignment" and "alienation," the court
turned to policy considerations. It compared the interest in benefits of the
nonemployee spouse under community property laws with the interests of
other parties such as business creditors, and it held payment of plan bene-
fits to the nonemployee spouse consistent with the purposes of section
206(d)(1) since families of employees were included in the class protected
by the statute.' 27 That factor, according to the court, distinguished com-
munity property claims of nonemployee spouses from claims of business
creditors who were excluded from the family unit protected by ERISA.'
28
124. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 922 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-
2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978). The court felt that conditioning the nonemploye spouse's
right to sue on the reason for the plan's failure to pay had several negative effects, including
the court's inability to determine federal jurisdictional questions based on the complaint and
the nonemployee spouse's dependency on the willingness of her/his spouse to sue the plan
or trustees on his/her behalf. Id.
125. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (1976).
126. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 924 (N.D. Cal.), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th
Cir. June 21, 1978). Judge Renfrew relied heavily on Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519 (1977) (preemptive intent must be clear and manifest), and the federal policy of nonin-
terference with the traditional state domain of domestic relations law. He rejected the
significance of characterizing the nonemployce spouse's claim as an ownership or creditor
interest. See 450 F. Supp. at 924.
127. 450 F. Supp. at 925-26. It has been argued, however, that the equities are not so
heavily on the side of those against preemption of community property laws. With respect
to ERISA's prohibition against assignment or alienation, it is only a court order requiring
direct payment of benefits from the benefit plan to the participant's former spouse that con-
fficts with ERISA's explicit terms and is preempted by § 514(a). ERISA does not inhibit the
courts in making any other equitable division of community property, including, for exam-
ple, ordering the employee spouse to pay one-half the pension benefits to his or her spouse
upon receipt. See Brief of Defendant in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 7,
Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978). In granting the
motion, Judge Poole disagreed with Stone's analysis of legislative intent concerning
ERISA's preemptive effect. He found no exception to ERISA's anti-assignment clause for
community property laws. Francis v. United Technologies Corp., slip op. at 3-4.
128. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 927 (N.D. Cal.), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th
Cir. June 21, 1978). According to Judge Renfrew, business creditors also, unlike the non-
employee spouse, have only themselves to blame for not thoroughly investigating the
debtor's assets before extending credit to one whose interest in an employee benefit plan has
been put beyond their reach. Id. See also Cody v. Riecker, 454 F. Supp. 22, 24 (E.D.N.Y.
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Turning to the second and more general preemption theory based on the
language of section 514(a), the court concluded that, despite its broad pre-
emptive effect, the law was not designed to preempt "any state law with
even the most tangential relation to ERISA."' 29 In the court's analysis,
community property laws came within the narrow category of laws affect-
ing employee benefit laws but remained outside the ambit of section
514(a).130 Thus, although the court found congressional intent to occupy
the field under ERISA, it also found community property laws beyond the
occupied field. 13' In thereby deferring to the state's role in domestic rela-
tions law, Stone follows Jones v. Rath Packing Co. and other recent accom-
modation cases.'
32
The Department of Labor filed an amicus brief in the appeal of Stone,
arguing that the "implied exception"' 33 under section 206(d) applies to
1978) (finding no ERISA preemption of a New York judgment and levy on pension funds to
support the employee's former spouse).
129. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 927 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-
2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978). Judge Renfrew adopted the "peripheral" test of Time Ins. Co.
v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 391 (Dane
County, Wis. Cir. Ct. Jan. 3, 1978) and cited the Time case with approval. 450 F. Supp. at
932. See text accompanying notes 265-69 infra.
130. As the author of the decisions in Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695
(N.D. Cal. 1978), appealdocketed, No. 78-1095 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1978) and Hewlett-Packard
v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal, 1977), aft'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978) (both finding broad preemption under ERISA, see text accom-
panying notes 144-51 and 214-24 infra), Judge Renfrew was constrained to distinguish his
opinion that ERISA preempts Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act. Besides the distinction he
found as to the persons protected under the challenged statute, Renfrew found significant
the fact that state regulation of benefit plans is far less established than is state control of
community property. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal
docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978).
131. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-
2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978). In both Hewlett-Packard and Agsalud, Judge Renfrew had
found that ERISA occupies the employee benefit field. See 425 F. Supp. at 1297; 442 F.
Supp. at 698. In Agsalud, Judge Renfrew had distinguished cases such as De Canas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976) and Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) on the basis of
ERISA's express occupation of the field. 442 F. Supp. at 698.
132. 450 F. Supp. at 932. See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
133. The notion of an "implied exception" to ERISA's section 206(d) anti-assignment
and alienation provision had been put forth by the government in an earlier case involving
compliance with a state court family support order. See Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae at 4-10, Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In Cartledge, the
Department of Justice argued that pension plans must comply with familial support orders
because Congress intended an implied exception to the anti-alienation provision for such
orders. Id.
Lawyers for plan administrators and other interested parties were quick to point out the
inconsistency between the government's position as articulated by the Department of Justice
in Cartledge and positions taken by IRS on the issue. IRS had issued a general information
letter to Union Carbide indicating that a plan which honors a state court order in a marital
dispute could lose its tax qualification status. See Memo to the File, Treatment of Marital
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state community property orders as well as familial support orders. ' 34 Al-
though the government's Stone brief supported affirmance of the lower
court decision, it urged the Ninth Circuit to clarify that the exception is
limited to enforcement of state decrees ordering payment of benefits based
on community property claims to the spouse or former spouse of a partici-
pant whose pension is in pay status.
35
IV. ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE STATUTES IMPACTING ON
EMPLOYEE WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS
A. State Regulation of Health Care
1. The Insurance Exception Cases
ERISA provides an exception from its general preemption rule for state
statutes regulating insurance. 36 The scope of this saving clause is limited,
Support Orders and Property Settlements, August 15, 1978 (memorandum of meeting with
Treasury and Labor Dep't officials prepared by Groom & Nordberg, Washington, D.C., on
file at Catholic University Law Review office). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)--13 (1978).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, however, found the
government's brief in Cartledge persuasive, and denied a request by the pension plan com-
mittee for an injunction barring enforcement of the state court order. See Cartledge v.
Miller, 457 F. Supp. at 1156. Accord, A.T.&T. v. Merry, Civ. No. B78-161, BNA PENSION
REP., Oct. 30, 1978, at D-16, (D. Conn. Oct. 2, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-7484 (2d Cir.
Oct. 11, 1978). The Justice Department filed an amicus brief in the Merry case supporting an
implied exemption for financial support and alimony decrees. BNA PENSION REP., Dec. 4,
1978, at A-21.
134. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor, BNA PENSION REP., Jan 8, 1979, at R-8. Inter-
estingly, one or two months earlier, Department of Labor officials had indicated that there
were serious questions whether the analysis used by the federal agencies in Cartledge, which
involved a common law family support order, would be applicable in an action based upon
a community property law. See BNA PENSION REP., Nov. 6, 1978, at A-25.
135. Brief of the Secretary of Labor, BNA PENSION REP., Jan. 8, 1979, at R-14. In
Cartledge, the pension benefits were also in pay status. In most cases, benefits have not yet
reached pay status. See Memo to File, supra note 133, at 4.
136. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)(1976). Section 514(b)(2)(A) pro-
vides that state insurance laws shall not be preempted but does not say what constitutes a
law which regulates insurance. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1976). Although definitions
of insurance have been advanced, writers in the field have not been able to agree upon a
single definition. See Brummond, supra note 20, at 68-69. In determining whether a partic-
ular state statute is preempted, the courts have generally avoided the question of whether a
state statute regulates insurance. Instead they have focused on whether a plan is an em-
ployee benefit plan which is free of state regulation (insurance or otherwise). See Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aft'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978); Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426
F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.), affdas mod#ied, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); Bell v. Employee
Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
In the Brummond article, supra note 20, the author delineated five types of state statutes
with at least some insurance aspects. These categories are: (1) employee benefit plan legisla-
tion establishing registration requirements, reporting and disclosure guidelines, and fiduci-
ary standards; (2) legislation regulating self-insured employee benefit plans; (3) legislation
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however, in that ERISA-covered employee benefits plans or any trust aris-
ing under them are neither "deemed" to be an insurance company or other
insurer, nor are they considered to be engaged in the business of insurance
for purposes of any state law purporting to regulate insurance companies
or insurance contracts. 137 Only plans established primarily for the purpose
of providing death benefits are specifically excluded from this so-called
deemer clause. 3
8
Courts have differed in their interpretations of the saving and deemer
clauses. Some courts have expansively construed the deemer clause,
thereby reducing the scope of the saving clause and expanding the reach of
federal preemption. 139 These cases have determined that when the plan
or entity at issue qualifies as an employee benefit plan, the state insurance
statute is inapplicable since the plan can not be "deemed" insurance within
the scope of such a statute.140 Other courts have narrowly construed the
deemer clause so as to give the saving clause greater effect.' 4' Regardless
of the approach, the cases consider state statutes which either provide for
health care services directly or do so indirectly through insurance or insur-
ance-type arrangements. Additionally, several decisions focus upon the
application of state insurance statutes to uninsured multiple employer wel-
regulating group insurance arrangements, including regulation of the group insurer (sol-
vency, ability to pay claims, competency of management), regulation of certain aspects of
transacting the group insurance business (claim handling, reasonable rates, mass marketing
requirements), and regulation of the content of group policies; (4) legislation regulating pre-
paid professional service plans including health maintenance organizations, dental service
corporations and prepaid legal service plans; and (5) legislation imposing a tax on group
insurance or Blue Cross/Blue Shield premiums as well as on self-insured employee benefit
plans. Brummond, supra note 20, at 97-111. Brummond predicted that direct employee
benefit plan regulation (category 1) would be the most likely to be preempted and that provi-
sions on pre-paid professional plan legislation (category 4) and group insurance legislation
(category 3) dealing with the regulation of the insurer or the organization would least likely
be preempted. See id. at 111-113.
137. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1976).
138. Id.
139. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), af 'd, 571
F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978); Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus
Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.), ajfdaasmodied, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1977); Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977); Hamber-
line v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977).
140. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afl'd,
571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978).
141. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980
(1978); Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
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fare arrangements. 142
a. Cases Broadly Construing the Deemer Clause
A case typifying the expansive approach is Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Barnes. 43 In Hewlett-Packard, representatives of various health benefit
plans' 44 sought to enjoin the regulation of these plans under the California
Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975 (Knox-Keene).145 The
defendant Commissioner of Corporations argued that Knox-Keene was a
state law regulating insurance and as such was expressly excluded from
preemption pursuant to ERISA's saving clause. 46 The court found de-
fendant's argument unpersuasive in light of the impact of the deemer
clause on the saving clause, and held that Knox-Keene was preempted to
142. See Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977);
Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977).
143. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afftd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 108 (1978).
144. Hewlett-Packard Co., Standard Oil Co., and Wells Fargo sponsored plans which
reimbursed employees for 80% or more of certain health care expenses. The Pacific Lumber
Company Employee Benefits Organization, a nonprofit Delaware corporation maintained
similar benefit plans for the employees of the Pacific Lumber Company, another plaintiff in
the case. The Joint Benefit Trust and the Drug Benefit Fund, jointly administered health
and welfare trust funds, offered comparable coverage for employees of the drug and canning
industries. The Joint Benefit Trust offered as alternatives to the self-funded indemnity
plans, the option of participating in Kaiser Health Plan, Inc., and in a prepaid dental plan
arranged with contracting doctors. 425 F. Supp. at 1295. Judge Renfrew did not discuss
extensively why the plaintiff's plans were considered to be employee benefit plans.
145. The Knox-Keene Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340 to 1345 (West Cum.
Supp. 1971-77), which became effective July 1, 1976, regulates the delivery of health care
services to California residents who participate in "health care service plans." Section 1345
defines a health care service plan as:
any person who undertakes to arrange for the provision of health care services to
subscribers and enrollees, or to pay for or to reimburse any part of the cost for such
services, in return for a prepaid or periodic charge paid by or on behalf of such
subscribers or enrollees, and who does not substantially indemnify subscribers or
enrollees for the cost of provided services.
Id. at § 1345(0.
Section 1342 indicates that the Knox-Keene Act was intended to promote the delivery of
low cost, quality health care through financially sound plans to participants well informed
about the benefits of various available plans. Id. at § 1342. In the words of the court:
[Knox-Keene] regulates such areas as funding, disclosure, sales practices, and
quality of services, and requires that any such plan be licensed by the state Com-
missioner of Corporations. Although primarily concerned with entities, plans or
contracts which directly deliver health care services, the statute seeks to regulate as
well those which provide insurance-type coverage, including self-funded plans
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afd, 571 F.2d
502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978).
146. 425 F. Supp. at 1300.
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the extent that it regulated ERISA-covered employee benefit plans. 147 The
court reasoned that each of the plaintiffs' health care plans qualified as an
employee welfare benefit plan, 48 and that ERISA's section 514(a) clearly
expressed congressional intent to preempt state statutes like Knox-Keene
to the extent they regulated employee benefit plans covered by ERISA.149
The court observed:
The fact that the state considers employee benefit plans to be a
unique variety of insurance arrangement, and subjects them to
specialized regulation under Knox-Keene rather than generalized
regulation under the entire panoply of law addressed to tradi-
tional insurers, makes no difference under ERISA. In seeking to
regulate plaintiffs' plans pursuant to Knox-Keene under the
theory that the statute applies to and that such plans constitute
"insurance," defendant contravenes the clear intent of Section
514(a) and (b) of ERISA that employee benefit plans, so dubbed
147. Such employee benefit plans would be those "established or maintained [1] by any
employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce or [2] by
any employee organization or organizations representing employees engaged in commerce
or in any industry or activity affecting commerce or [3] by both." ERISA § 3(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(a) (1976).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the grounds relied upon by the lower court. See Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978). With
minimal discussion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of appellant's
contentions that: "(1) § 514(a) ERISA was not intended to preempt Knox-Keene; (2) that
Knox-Keene is a state insurance law exempted by [§] 514(b) from ERISA's otherwise broad
preemption; [and] (3) that ERISA is unconstitutional if construed to preempt Knox-Keene."
571 F.2d at 503-04 (footnotes omitted). In making the last contention, the appellant argued
that full federal preemption is unconstitutional because the Tenth Amendment precludes
such a broad substitution of national for local regulation. The court's constitutional analysis
in Hewlett-Packard as well as constitutional discussions in other cases will not be discussed
because the focus of this article is statutory construction.
The Ninth Circuit also discussed and rejected an additional argument by appellant that
preemption of Knox-Keene would impair other federal legislation in violation of ERISA
§ 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1976). The appellant specifically mentioned the Health Main-
tenance Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3000e to 3000e-15 (1976) and the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 to 1015 (1976). See 571 F.2d at 504-05.
148. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1295 (N.D. Cal. 1977), af'd, 571
F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978).
149. 425 F. Supp. at 1297. The court found that congressional intent to occupy the field
could not have been expressed more precisely. Id. Even though Judge Renfrew analyzed
the legislative history of § 514(a), he alternatively relied on the "plain meaning" rule of
statutory construction which precludes inquiry into the legislative history if the statutory
language unequivocally expresses its meaning. See United States v. American Trucking
Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940). Because the Supreme Court in Train v. Colorado Public
Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976), had expressed dissatisfaction with the
"plain-meaning" rule, the Ninth Circuit on appeal looked exclusively to Judge Renfrew's
examination of the legislative history. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502, 504 n.4
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978). See notes 96-97 and accompanying text, supra,
for a discussion of the legislative history of § 514.
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or under any other name, be free of state regulation.' 50
The court thus interpreted the deemer clause so broadly as to preempt the
state insurance statute anytime it related to an ERISA-covered employee
benefit plan. Accordingly, the Hewlett-Packard test for determining
whether a state statute is preempted turns on whether the plan regulated
by state statute is an employee benefit plan under ERISA.15'
In Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp. ,152 the Sev-
enth Circuit adopted the analytical approach of Hewlett-Packard in apply-
ing the definition of employee benefit plan. The case involved a suit by a
plan beneficiary who had suffered serious physical injuries when he was
eighteen years old. The youth filed a claim under a group medical insur-
ance policy purchased by his father's employer.1 53 Just before the acci-
dent, however, the employer's insurance agency had changed carriers from
a conventional insurance company to a purported multiple employer wel-
fare trust.' 54 Under the new policy and contrary to Indiana law, 55 plain-
tiffs benefits would have ended on his twentieth birthday. The key
question became whether state statutory provisions favorable to the plain-
tiff were preempted by ERISA.
Taking an expansive view of the deemer clause similar to that in Hew-
lett-Packard,56 the district court held that since the plan in question was
150. 571 F.2d at 504.
151. Judge Renfrew did not go into great detail in analyzing whether the plaintiffs' plans
were employee benefit plans. Such detail was absent not because the determination is unim-
portant, but rather because such plans were clearly employee benefit plans. Contrast this
situation with the facts, for example, of Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv.
Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977), and Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F.
Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
152. 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.), modifying 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
153. 567 F.2d at 693.
154. Id. at 694. Wayne Chemical, Inc. had purchased group medical insurance coverage
for several of its employees and their families from Columbus Agency Service Corp.
(CASCO). CASCO is an insurance and health plan brokerage company which acts as agent
for entities such as Association Life Insurance Company, the conventional insurer, and Na-
tional Multiple Employers Foundation (NMEF), the purported trust.
CASCO placed the insurance with Association Life until, in July 1, 1975, coverage was
changed to NMEF. Although CASCO informed Wayne that a new carrier would continue
coverage, Wayne was not advised of the identity of the new carrier or of any adverse change
in the terms of coverage until'months after the changeover. Id. at 694-95.
155. Under IND. CODE § 27-8-5-10(B)(4) (Bums 1975), group health insurance coverage
of an employee's dependent may not terminate on attainment of a limiting age if that depen-
dent is disabled when he reaches the limiting age.
156. Chief Judge Eschbach stated that courts should be spared the task of deciding which
state laws governing an employee benefit plan may be enforced concurrently with federal
law. The preemption question, he said, should be resolved simply by determining whether
the plan involved is an ERISA-covered plan. Since the judge concluded the benefit plan
was a covered plan, he found that no state law could govern any aspect of the plan. 426 F.
Supp. at 321.
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an ERISA-covered employee benefit plan, the pertinent Indiana law on
insurance was not applicable.157 Nevertheless, the court granted relief to
the plaintiff by holding that federal common law governing employee ben-
efit plans did not permit the termination of the plaintiffs insurance bene-
fits. 158
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's order, but on different grounds. In the Seventh Circuit's view, if
the employer were a participant in an ERISA-covered employee benefit
plan issuing the insurance in question, then the state laws relating to that
plan would be preempted.159 The court, however, found no indication in
the record that any plan or trust was ever involved in the transactions be-
tween the employer and the insurance agency or the multiple employer
welfare arrangement. 160 Moreover, even assuming that the alleged welfare
arrangement was the insurer and was maintained by some employers,
ERISA preemption was inapplicable because the employer was not a plan
participant.161 The Seventh Circuit additionally observed that ERISA's
157. Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316, 320, 321
(N.D. Ind.), modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977). The district court did not clarify what
the "plan in question here" was. Arguably, it could have been the National Multiple Em-
ployers Foundation Plan, the CASCO Insurance Trust, or Wayne Chemical's health insur-
ance program for its employees. The Seventh Circuit interpreted the phrase to refer to the
NMEF Plan. See 567 F.2d at 698.
158. 426 F. Supp. at 322-326. In concluding that Congress has invested the courts with a
duty to create law governing aspects of employee benefit plans not specifically regulated by
ERISA, the district court cited the House Conference Report on ERISA, a statement by
Senator Javits on the ERISA conference report, and the ERISA statutory scheme itself. Id.
at 321, 322.
159. Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir.
1977). The appellant-insurance agency argued that the NMEF Plan was an employee bene-
fit plan and that the employer had participated in the plan. Id. at 698. See Brummond, The
Legal Status of Uninsured Noncollectively-Bargained Multiple-Employer We/fare Trusts
Under ERISA and State Insurance Laws, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 701, 717 (1977). Based on
the facts of the case, however, the court concluded that the NMEF plan was not an em-
ployee benefit plan. It did not analyze in detail the nature of the multiple employer welfare
arrangement.
The NMEF Plan presumably was the unsigned "National Multiple Employers Founda-
tion Plan and Trust Agreement" reproduced in the opinion and which provided the new
health coverage when the first insurer was dropped. This "Trust Agreement," which had
never been seen by the employer or the other plaintiffs until after the suit commenced, pur-
ported to establish a fund which was intended to comply with ERISA, although the provi-
sions of the plans were not set forth. 567 F.2d at 696-98.
160. 567 F.2d at 698-99.
161. Id. at 699. Wayne Chemical had no knowledge of the plant's existence until long
after the date the new insurance allegedly was obtained by the agency, and the company
never entered into an agreement to establish a plan. The court noted that:
An employer does not become a participant in, or establish or maintain, a plan
by applying for insurance and paying premiums for what it understands to be in-
surance without any knowledge that the plan exists. Establishing, maintaining, or
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preemption of state insurance statutes relating to employee benefit plans
extends to insurance statutes which directly affect such plans but not to
statutes which affect the insurer or a policy purchased by a plan from an
insurer. 
162
Other cases broadly construing the deemer clause have involved multi-
ple employer trusts (METs) established by independent parties to provide
welfare benefit programs to employees of small employers. METs have
had significant appeal to employers with ten or fewer employees who fre-
quently have difficulty in finding an insurance company willing to provide
group health insurance or other types of benefits at an economically viable
Cost. 163 Although MET assets can be used to purchase insurance policies
for covered employees, 164 some METs only pay benefits out of trust assets
generated by employer contributions.
165
MET-type arrangements are used in a variety of situations. Although
jointly-administered Taft-Hartley welfare plans are not considered METs,
METs may be collectively bargained or noncollectively bargained. 166 En-
tities described as METs have sold memberships directly to employees
without involving employers.' 67 Common usage of the term "MET" has
extended its scope to multiple employer welfare arrangements which in-
volve entities other than trusts, such as unincorporated associations.
68
The financial failure of certain large METs 169 as well as their potential
participating in a plan requires an intent, which presupposes an awareness of the
existence of the plan. Wayne was therefore not among the 'participants' in the
NMEF plan, if indeed there were any.
Id.
162. Id. at 700. The court relied on Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978) discussed in text accompanying notes 190-201 infra.
163. See Brummond, supra note 159, at 702.
164. Id. at 700.
165. Fletcher, Preemption and the Multiple Employer Trust (MET) Problem, in TEXT-
BOOK FOR EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN TRUSTEES, ADMINISTRATORS AND ADVISORS 71, 72
(1977) (proceedings of 19th International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans Annual
Educational Conference).
166. See Brummond, supra note 159, at 702. Taft-Hartley plans are those set up pursu-
ant to the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976). See note 41 supra.
167. See Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (D. Ariz. 1977).
168. See Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
169. On February 2, 1977, a California-based MET, the National Multiple Employers'
Foundation, filed a petition in bankruptcy. Two months later, the Hospital Welfare Associ-
ation Trust, another California-based MET, filed an action alleging it was insolvent and
requesting the appointment of a federal receiver. Brummond, supra note 159, at 717.
National Multiple Employers' Foundation was also the trust involved in Wayne Chem., Inc.
v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977). It is estimated that three
million people are currently receiving welfare benefits from uninsured METs. The number
of uninsured METs that have become insolvent is substantial, and the effects on individuals
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for deception and abuse 170 have led state insurance commissioners to at-
tempt to regulate these entities.' 7' These attempts have raised the question
of whether ERISA preempts the application of state insurance statutes to
METs.'
72
Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Association 73 is a representative case.
In Bell, the Kansas district court found first that ERISA occupied the en-
tire field of employee benefit plans.' 74 However, it went on to hold that
Kansas' insurance law was not preempted by ERISA as it applied to the
defendant's health care program. In reaching this conclusion, the court
took a broad view of the deemer clause 175 and, as in Hewlett-Packard,
76
focused on whether the health care arrangement in question was an
ERISA-covered employee benefit plan. 77 The defendant, Employee Se-
curity Benefit Association (ESBA), an unincorporated association, offered
what it termed a "Major Medical Expense and Graded Death Benefit Plan
who have lost promised benefits are dramatic. See 1978 Oversight Hearings, supra note 27,
at 658-60 (statement of NAIC).
170. Id. at 715-717.
171. Id. at 704.
172. See Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977);
Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977); Rottman v. Employee Se-
curity Benefit Ass'n, No. 77-0106 BRT (D. Nev., Jan. 19, 1978); Montana ex rel. Omholt v.
Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, No. CU-77-2-H (D. Mont., Nov. 18, 1977); Bell v. United
Health and Retirement Ass'n, No. 77-4085 (D. Kan., Aug. 22, 1977).
The Department of Labor helped somewhat to answer the preemption question involving
uninsured multiple employer welfare arrangements in its amicus curiae brief for Bell v. Em-
ployee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977), reprinted in BNA PENSION
REP., Aug. 15, 1978, at R-1. Ian Lanoff, Administrator of Pension and Welfare Benefit
Programs at the Labor Department, has represented the Department's view to be that any
diversion of plan assets to pay commissions to persons soliciting new employers or employ-
ees by a welfare or pension plan covered by ERISA would be improper. BNA PENSION
REP., July, 7 1977, at A-20. Additionally, according to Administrator Lanoff, the Depart-
ment has concluded that the activities of brokers or agents who solicit new employers and
employees for METs are not preempted from state regulatory authority by ERISA. Id. at
A-21. Moreover, an agent selling to a nonparticipating employer or employee is subject to
state authority even if the MET involved would be legally considered an employee benefit
plan. Id.
173. 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
174. Id. at 385-88.
175. Id. The court stated:
In light of this legislative history, we conclude that federal preemption in the
area of pensions and other employee benefit programs is virtually total. We are
unable to agree with the decisions which apparently have applied a narrow inter-
pretation to § 1144. See Insurers'Action Council, Inc. P. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921
(D. Minn. 1976); Dawson v. Whaland, No. 76-266 (D.N.H. 1976).
Rather, we subscribe to the view announced by the court in Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
437 F. Supp. at 387.
176. See text accompanying notes 144-51 supra.
177. 437 F. Supp. at 388-396.
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for Members and Members' Families."' 78 ESBA referred to its program as
a "Self-funded, Self-adjusting Employee Benefit Plan" established under
ERISA and marketed the plan directly to employees through insurance
agents. 1
79
Finding that most employee benefit plans meet standard definitions of
insurance, the court isolated five pre-ERISA characteristics of employee
benefit plans which the ESBA program did not have.' 80 The court also
examined the ERISA definition of an employee benefit plan 18 and found
that the defendant's program did not come within its limits. 182 In terms of
the statute, ESBA was not an "employer," since it did not employ the
members of the ESBA program and did not act directly or indirectly for
the employers of the ESBA members.
83
The court did, however, experience some difficulty in deciding whether
ESBA was an "employee organization,"' 84 maintaining a benefit plan for
its members. An "employee organization" is generally any labor union or
employee representation committee in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose of dealing with employees concerning an em-
ployee benefit plan. 85 An "employee organization" also includes any
"employees' beneficiary association" organized for the purpose of estab-
lishing a plan.'8 6 With respect to the first element of the definition, the
court concluded that ESBA was not a labor union but rather was a third
party entrepreneur which did not exist for the purpose of dealing with em-
ployees concerning an employee benefit plan. 187 Relying heavily upon the
178. Id. at 384.
179. Id. D.M.A., Inc., an agency organized by two of ESBA's officers, marketed the
ESBA program for a fee based upon member contributions, and Benefit Services Corpora-
tion, which was organized by individuals having substantial ties to ESBA, provided admin-
istrative services for a contribution-based fee. Id. at 384-85.
180. Id. at 391-92. The court stated:
Clearly, the [employee benefit plan] concept as it existed when Congress passed
the preemption provisions of ERISA involved the following characteristics: (1) [sic]
it was provided by an employer or homogeneous employee organization, such as a
union; (b) it was non-commercial in nature; (c) it did not involve solicitation; (d) it
was not intended to be actuarially sound; (e) because the employees could look
only to the fund, and not to the provider of that fund, the rates were substantially
lower than insurance rates.
Id. at 391.
181. See note 6 supra.
182. 437 F. Supp. at 392.
183. Id. at 393.
184. See 437 F. Supp. at 393-96; ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976).
185. 437 F. Supp. at 394; ERISA § 3(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(4) (1976).
186. 437 F. Supp. at 394; ERISA § 3(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(4) (1976).
187. 437 F. Supp. at 394.
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Labor Department's amicus curiae brief, 188 the court dealt with the second
element by stating that an essential ingredient of an "employees' benefici-
ary association" is a commonality of interests among its employee mem-
bers and that this commonality was lacking in the ESBA program.'
89
b. Cases Narrowly Construing the Deemer Clause
In contrast to decisions broadly construing the deemer clause, courts
reading its language more narrowly have held challenged state statutes to
be within the saving clause, thereby precluding preemption. In Wad-
sworth v. Whaland,190 the United States District Court for New Hampshire
held that ERISA did not preempt a New Hampshire insurance statute re-
quiring insurers to provide coverage for treatment of mental illnesses and
emotional disorders in group health policies. 19 With one exception, all of
the plaintiffs were administrators of collectively bargained health and wel-
fare funds. 192 Approximately ninety percent of the benefits paid by the
plans were provided through group insurance policies purchased with trust
funds.193 The district court refused to hold that the New Hampshire insur-
ance statute which directly regulated group insurance policies and indi-
188. The Secretary of Labor argued that ESBA was not an employee welfare benefit plan
under Section 3(1) of ERISA. ESBA did not claim to be a labor union, and because in
ESBA there is little or no employee participation and no dealing with employers, the gov-
ernment concluded that ESBA was not an employee representation committee. The Secre-
tary also contended that ESBA was not an employees' beneficiary association because the
members did not share a commonality of interest with respect to their employment relation-
ships. See Brief for Dep't of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Bell v. Employee Security Benefit
Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977), reprinted in BNA PENSION REP., Aug. 15, 1977, at
R- I.
189. Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 Supp. 382, 394-96 (D. Kan. 1977).
Finding little help in the statutory description of employees' beneficiary association or the
definition of an employee benefit plan, the court drew upon prior definitions of the term
"'employees' beneficiary association" which were developed under the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed by ERISA), and
I.R.C. § 501(c)(9). The court found that the definitions under these two statutes embodied
the concept of commonality of interests among employees. Id. at 395, 396.
Section 201(b)(l) of the Williams-Javits ERISA Improvements Act of 1978, S. 3017, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 124 CONG. REC. S6592 (daily ed. May 1, 1978), would have codified
a definition of employees beneficiary association which included a commonality of interest
element. Section 266 of the bill also required that uninsured multiple employer welfare
arrangements which are employee benefit plans be subject to such solvency and reserve
standards as set by the Secretary of Labor. 124 CONG. REC. at S6596.
190. No. 76-266 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980
(1978).
191. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-a (Supp. 1977).
192. As such, the plans were administered by a joint board composed of union and em-
ployer representatives as required by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c) (1976). See note 41 supra.




rectly regulated insured plans was preempted by ERISA, relying primarily
on the saving clause exception to ERISA preemption for state regulation
of insurance.1
94
The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the deemer clause on its face did
not prohibit a state from indirectly affecting employee benefit plans by
regulating the contents of group insurance policies purchased by such
plans.195 Nonetheless, the court intimated that even indirect regulation of
employee benefit plans could be preempted under ERISA's section
514(a). 196 Because the New Hampshire statute at issue was an insurance
statute, the court found it exempted from preemption by the saving
clause. 197 Central to this conclusion was the accommodation made be-
tween section 514(a) and the saving clause by the deemer clause. By con-
struing the deemer clause narrowly, the court permitted an insurance
statute to affect an employee benefit plan indirectly. 98 The court found its
interpretation of the deemer clause to comport with the federal policy of
deference to state insurance regulation' 99 and dismissed plaintiff s inter-
pretation as leading to an untenable restriction of state governance of
group insurance.2°°
In considering Wadsworth, however, it is important to note that the state
statute under examination indirectly affected employee benefit plans. De-
194. BNA PENSION REP., July 5, 1978, at D-7, D-7 to D-9 (D.N.H. Feb. 11, 1977).
195. Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 78 (1st Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 435 U.S. 980
(1978).
196. 562 F.2d at 76, 77.
197. Id. at 77.
198. Id. at 77-78.
199. See, e.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1976) (any preemption of state
insurance laws must be explicit). The First Circuit observed that the national policy of state
primacy in insurance is twice reaffirmed in ERISA: first with the saving clause; and second
with § 514(d) which provides that ERISA does not supersede other federal statutes, includ-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 78 (1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
200. 562 F.2d at 78. The court found that the ERISA's definition of "state" as any state
agency which "purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of em-
ployee benefit plans covered by this title", 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1976) (emphasis added),
did not require broad construction of the deemer clause, as plaintiff suggested. Such a con-
struction would "emasculate the saving clause." 562 F.2d at 78.
The plaintiffs' argument that the failure to preempt might bankrupt some plans which
could not afford the expensive mental health coverage did not impress the First Circuit. The
court noted that Congress established a task force to study the effects and desirability of
federal preemption and intended to provide remedial legislation where necessary. Id. The
court apparently also was unimpressed with the point made in the amicus brief of the
ERISA Industry Committee that the lower court "failed to grasp the magnitude of the cha-
otic effect which would befall multi-state plans attempting to comply, not only with ERISA,
but potentially with fifty (50) different, additional, and ever-changing state laws applicable
to employee welfare benefit plans." Brief for Amicus Curiae at 30, Wadsworth v. Whaland,
562 F.2d 70 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
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spite statements about the breadth of the deemer clause and the freedom of
employee benefit plans from any state regulation, the rulings in Hewlett-
Packard, Wayne Chemical, Inc., and Bell v. Employee Security Benefit
Association applied only to state statutes which directly affected employee
benefit plans or entities claiming to be such plans. It is thus possible to
reconcile the rationales of Wadsworth and Hewlett-Packard, as did the
Seventh Circuit in Wayne Chemical, Inc. 201
A case which is clearly inconsistent with the broad construction cases,
however, is Insurers'Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton.202 At issue in Heaton
was the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act of 1976,203 a stat-
ute requiring that employers who offer health care plans to their employees
include certain types of coverage.2°4 Rejecting plaintiffs' contention that
ERISA preempted that portion of the Minnesota Act relating to employee
benefit plans, the district court refused to grant the declaratory and injunc-
tive relief requested.
205
Stating that, with very narrow exceptions, ERISA should not be con-
strued to relieve any person from any state law regulating insurance, the
court concluded that the conflict between the challenged state insurance
law and ERISA must be very clear to trigger the preemption provision.
2°6
The court noted that ERISA's welfare plan provisions had little to do with
the substantive requirements of the Minnesota statute and presumably did
not create a sufficiently clear conflict in order to trigger preemption.
20 7 It
also observed that ERISA does not supersede existing federal statutes, in-
201. See Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692, 697-700
(7th Cir. 1977).
202. 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
203. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62E.01 to .17 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
204. Insurers Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton 423 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D. Minn. 1976).
The statute requires each employer who provides a plan of health care coverage to make
available to employees in the state a plan which is certified by the Commissioner of Insur-
ance as a number two, qualified plan. Such a plan provides minimum benefits equal to at
least 80% of the cost of specified covered services in excess of an annual deductible which
does not exceed $500 per person. A plan can provide coverage through self-insurance, indi-
vidual policies, group policies, nonprofit health service plans or health maintenance organi-
zations or any combination of these. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62E.02 to .03, .06 (West Cum.
Supp. 1978).
The statute also requires that every health and accident insurer offer to Minnesota resi-
dents qualified policies or unqualified policies containing a specified amount of major medi-
cal coverage. Id. at § 62E.04. The Act also created the Comprehensive Health Association
which is charged with operating a comprehensive health insurance plan designed to offer
policies to individuals who are unable to obtain health and accident insurance through nor-
mal channels. Id. at § 62E. 10.
205. Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D. Minn. 1976).




cluding the McCarran-Ferguson Act which mandates that the business of
insurance shall be regulated by the states.
208
Heaton took a very limited view of the deemer clause and an expansive
view of the saving clause,2°9 adopting in effect a preemption rule that had
been clearly rejected by the Congress. 210 It is interesting to note that in
Wadsworth, a case in which the State of Minnesota participated as amicus
curiae, the First Circuit rejected the argument that section 514(a) preempts
only those state statutes which purport to regulate an area expressly cov-
ered by ERISA.211
2 ERISA's Disability Insurance Plan Exemption
Section 514(a) preempts any and all state laws insofar as they relate to
any employee benefit plan described in ERISA section 4(a) and not ex-
empt under section 4(b).212 Section 4(b)(3) exempts from Title I coverage
a plan which is "maintained solely for the purpose of complying with ap-
plicable. . . disability insurance laws. '213 Accordingly, if a state enacts a
disability insurance statute and an employer maintains a plan solely to
comply with that statute, the plan will be regulated entirely by the state
law rather than by ERISA.
Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud214 illustrates the difficulties in applying the
disability insurance plan exemption. In Agsalud, the plaintiff-employer
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to exempt its employee welfare
benefit plan 215 from compliance with the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care
208. Id. at 926 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 to 1015 (1976)). For a discussion of McCarran-
Fetguson, see note 199 and accompanying text supra.
209. Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921, 926 (D. Minn. 1976).
Presumably the reference to "a very narrow exception" is to the deemer clause.
210. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra. See also Standard Oil Co. v.
Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 698, 706, 707 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1095
(9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1978).
211. Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 76, 77 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
980 (1978). In referring to the Heaton decision, the ERISA Industry Committee's amicus
curiae brief in Wadsworth stated that Heaton "was limited in its discussion of preemption to
a single paragraph, failed to consider the relevant legislative history, and should, in our
view, be weighted accordingly as authority addressing the preemption issue herein." Brief
for Amicus Curiae at 20, n.10.
212. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
213. ERISA § 4(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1976).
214. 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1095 (9th Cir. Jan. 16,
1978).
215. 442 F. Supp. at 697. Some of plaintiffs Hawaiian employees, annuitants, and their
dependents elected to participate in the company's self-funded health care plan which reim-
bursed 80% or more of covered medical expenses incurred by the participants. The plain-
tiff's plan, however, did not provide all the benefits required by the Hawaii statute, including
alcohol and drug abuse coverage. Moreover, the plan failed to comply with certain report-
ing requirements of the Hawaii statute. Id. at 696.
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Act,2 16 arguing that ERISA preempted the Hawaii statute in this instance.
The state contended, however, that since its statute was a disability insur-
ance law, ERISA's preemption provision was inapplicable. 217 The district
court held that the Hawaii statute was not a disability insurance law and
was therefore preempted by ERISA.
218
The parties agreed that a disability insurance law replaces wages lost
because of nonoccupational illness and injury. They differed, however,
over whether disability insurance laws provide for the payment of medical
expenses in addition to the payment of lost wages. Examining the laws of
other states, the court noted that disability insurance laws generally deal
only with disabling nonoccupational illness and injury.219 Since Hawaii's
law required insurance against all nonoccupational illness or injury, disa-
bling or not, the court concluded that it was not a disability insurance
law.220 Moreover, the court noted that while the benefits available under
disability insurance laws are limited basically to replacement of wages, the
benefits required by the Hawaii statute cover medical and hospital ex-
penses.221 The court further observed that the legislative history of ERISA
disclosed no explicit congressional decision to exempt state health insur-
ance laws. 222 Faced with the absence of legislative history addressing this
issue, the court concluded that the preemption of state health insurance
laws was mandated by the clear language in the statute.223 The court also
found no merit in the defendant's contention that because the Hawaii stat-
216. The Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act requires employers in the state to offer a com-
prehensive prepaid health care plan to their employees. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-
51 (1976). In 1976, the Act was amended to require that plans cover diagnosis and treatment
of alcohol and drug abuse. 1976 Haw. Sess. Laws ch. 25, § 2 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 393-7(c)(6) (1976)). Administrative regulations adopted pursuant to the Hawaii Act in-
clude certain reporting requirements differing from those of ERISA. See Standard Oil Co.
v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 696 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1095 (9th Cir.
Jan. 16, 1978).
217. 442 F. Supp. at 697-98.
218. Id. at 697-702.
219. Id. at 698.
220. Id.
221. Id. Judge Renfrew supported his conclusion with an analysis of the Old-Age Survi-
vors and Disability Insurance provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 to 432
(1976), the Federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 351 to 367 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975), the Welfare and Pensions Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, P.L. 85-836, 72 Stat.
997 (repealed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 103 1(a)(1) (1976)), and the disability insurance statutes
of New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:21-25 to 43:21-56 (West Cum. Supp. 1978), New
York, N.Y. WORK CoMp. LAW §§ 202 to 204 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1978), California,
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 2601 to 3272 (West Cum. Supp. 1978), and Rhode Island, R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 28-39-2 to 28-41-32 (Supp. 1976). Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp.
695, 699-702 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1095 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1978).
222. 442 F. Supp. at 705.
223. Id. at 706.
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ute regulates matters other than those regulated by ERISA, there could be
no preemption under section 514(a). Instead, the court held that Congress
had rejected such a limited approach to preemption, despite the arguable
wisdom of that approach.
224
B. State Taxation of Self-Funded Welfare Plans
Preemption challenges have also been raised in conjunction with state
efforts to levy special taxes on plan benefits. In National Carriers' Confer-
ence Committee v. Heffernan,225 the plaintiffs226 sought to enjoin the impo-
sition of a state tax227 on benefits paid out to state residents under the
Railroad Employees National Dental Plan.228 The plaintiffs claimed that
the plan was an ERISA-covered employee welfare benefit plan and that
ERISA preempted the Connecticut tax statute regulating such plans.229
At the court's invitation, the United States Secretary of Labor filed a
memorandum as amicus curiae also contending that the Connecticut tax
statute was preempted by ERISA.230 Maintaining that Congress had pre-
empted the field of plan regulation,23' the Secretary argued that the Con-
224. Id. at 706-07. In the judge's view, ERISA's passage meant the creation of a morato-
rium of indefinite length on the passage of state health insurance laws. Judge Renfrew was
troubled by Congress' preemption of state health insurance laws apparently without specific
discussion of the need for such a step. He advised federal legislators to heed the admonition
of Justice Brandeis to the federal courts that to "stay experimentation in things social and
economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation." Id. at 711 (citing New York Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
225. 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978).
226. The plaintiffs were the National Carriers' Conference Committee (NCCC) and the
eleven individual members of the committee as fiduciaries of the Railroad Employees Na-
tional Dental Plan. The NCCC negotiates with the labor organizations on behalf of most of
the nation's railroads regarding pay, rules, and working conditions. Id. at 915.
227. The Connecticut statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-212C (Supp. 1978), requires em-
ployee welfare benefit plans to pay a tax in the amount of two and three quarter percent of
benefits paid through a self-insurance mechanism to participants and beneficiaries residing
in the state. The tax is not imposed on benefits provided through an insurance carrier. Id.
228. National Carriers' Conf. Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978).
The plan was a collectively-bargained plan paying benefits to railroad employees and their
dependents for specified dental expenses. The plan was maintained by contributions from
the employer-railroads and covered individuals residing throughout the nation. Id. at 915.
229. Id.
230. Memorandum of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 5-6. Earlier, the de-
fendant Tax Commissioner had moved to dismiss the action, maintaining that the suit was
barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), which prohibits federal courts
from enjoining state taxes when an adequate state remedy exists. National Carriers' Conf.
Comm. v. Heffernan, 440 F. Supp. 1281, 1282 (D. Conn. 1977). The court denied the defend-
ant's motion because the action came within both statutory and judicial exceptions to the
Act's restriction on jurisdiction. Id. at 1282-84.
231. Memorandum of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 12.
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necticut statute related to an employee benefit plan within the language of
ERISA's section 514(a) and that section 514(b) did not save it.232 Citing
Wadsworth v. Whaland and Hewlett-Packard v. Barnes,233 the Secretary
contended that the deemer clause overrode the saving clause regardless of
whether Connecticut deemed a welfare plan to be an insurance company
subject to insurance law or implemented a parallel legislative scheme to
the same effect.234 The Secretary also maintained that the state statute im-
permissibly inhibited ERISA-covered plans because the higher rate of tax
imposed on self-funded plans discouraged self-insurance and favored the
purchase of insurance from a carrier.
235
Apparently swayed by the government's arguments, the court held the
Connecticut statute preempted insofar as it related to employee benefit
plans. It concluded that the language of the federal statute, its legislative
history, and the subsequent judicial interpretations supported a broad con-
struction of the preemption provision. 236 The court rejected the state's ef-
forts to distinguish taxation from regulation and to read the preemption
provision narrowly. Dismissing the argument that preemption of the state
taxing power was unnecessary to accomplish ERISA's goal of protecting
plans from conflicting state requirements, 237 the court ruled that Congress
chose not to exempt the taxing power from ERISA's broad preemption
provision.
232. Id. The Secretary noted that in preparing the conference report, Congress was well
aware that a number of states had undertaken in varying degrees regulation of employee
benefit plans in general, and self-funded plans in particular. Id. at 13-14.
233. See text accompanying notes 144-51 and 190-201 supra.
234. Memorandum of Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 16. The Secretary stated:
Although the State of Connecticut has not brought its entire body of insurance
laws to bear on self-funded employee welfare benefit plans, it may be viewed as
having deemed such plans to be insurance companies for purposes of taxation. But
whether the state deems employee benefit plans to be insurance companies, or con-
structs a parallel legislative scheme directed at plans without utilizing the fiction
that such plans are actually insurance companies, ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B) will still
bar application of the state law to ERISA-covered plans.
Id. The Secretary noted in a footnote to the preceding quote that at the time of enactment of
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-212(c), the tax rate for self-funded plans and for net premiums
received by domestic insurance companies was the same. Also, this tax provision makes the
assessment, payment, appeal and other mechanisms used for collection of premium taxes on
insurance companies equally applicable to self-insured welfare plans. Memorandum of Sec-
retary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 16.
235. Id. at 17.
236. National Carriers Conf. Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D. Conn.
1978).
237. Id. at 917-18.
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C Regulation of Legal Services Plans
One of the more recent types of welfare plans to become popular is the
legal services plan.238 It was not until 1973 that the Taft-Hartley Act was
amended to allow jointly-administered legal services plans. 239 Although
there were only 600 group legal services plans in operation in 1969, by
1977 the number had risen to around 5,000.240 It is estimated that group
legal services now cover several million people.
241
238. Legal services plans are designed to meet the needs of middle income Americans.
The top 10% of our society can pay for traditional legal services and is sophisticated enough
to use them effectively. The bottom 20% of our society is unable to pay any amount for legal
services but is served by free legal services programs for the poor. Because legal services
have not been available to them, the vast middle group-accounting for 70% of our soci-
ety-have limited perceptions concerning legal problems and effective use of lawyers.
Kirby, Prepaid Legal Services and the Insurance Industry, 12 FORUM 324, 324 (1976).
The constitutional right of citizens to associate to obtain legal services has been upheld in
four Supreme Court cases. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW
v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex
rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
239. Pub. L. No. 93-95, 87 Stat. 314 (1973) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976)). Passage
of the amendment was supported by a coalition including the AFL-CIO, the United Auto
Workers, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the American Bar Association, major
insurance companies, and consumer groups. DeMent, Pre-Paid Legal Service Plans.- Past
Developments, Present Status and Future Prospects, PENSION WORLD, July 1978, at 17. Con-
tributions by employers to a legal services plan and benefits received from a plan were tax-
able income to employees until 1976. In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress added an
exemption for legal service trust funds established by employers either on their own or
through collective bargaining. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2143(b), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified
at I.R.C. § 501(c)(20)). Congress also granted an exclusion from employee gross income for
both amounts contributed to legal services funds by an employer on behalf of his employees
as well as the value of the benefits received by employees. Id. at § 2134(a) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 120).
240. Broadman, A New Piece of the Legal Rock.- The Move Toward Group Legal Services,
DISTRICT LAWYER, Winter 1977, at 21. In January 1978, the Department of Labor reported
that about 3,500 prepaid legal services plans had filed annual reports with it. DeMent, supra
note 239, at 17.
Group legal services plans were first established for union members, but they are now
available for other employee groups as well as a variety of associations. Among those bene-
fiting from group legal services are: the Alaska Teamsters; an association of San Francisco
prostitutes; the Texas Classroom Teachers Association; and the Ohio Buckeye Potato Chip
employees. Broadman, supra, at 21. For more information on the operation of group legal
services plans, see Baron, de Fuentes, Gustin, Marangi & Slate, Group Legal Services: A
Concept Whose Time Has Come, 51 L.A. B.J. 581 (1976).
241. See Broadman, supra note 240, at 21 (citing an estimate by the Center for Consum-
ers Legal Services). The failure of legal services plans to spread even more since the change
in Taft-Hartley can be explained by two factors: (1) the inflation/recession state of the econ-
omy which has not only put a premium on more take-home wages but also has caused an
increase in the costs of more traditional benefits such as health care; (2) unfamiliarity with
prepaid systems and the use of lawyers in nonlitigation or counseling roles. Kirby, supra
note 238, at 324-25. See also N. LEVIN, supra note 2, at 451-52 (editor's note) suggesting that
three ingredients were needed for legal services plans to increase: first, IRS regulations must
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ERISA coverage in this area is limited to prepaid legal services plans. 242
Although one state court has held that legal services plans are not gener-
ally considered to be insurance or subject to regulation by state insurance
commissioners, 243 other states may attempt to regulate such plans under
insurance laws. 24" Hence, legal services plans encounter the same poten-
tial preemption conflicts as do other welfare benefit plans with regard to
state insurance regulation.245 They also have problems common to other
types of benefit plans in which employers contract with insurance compa-
nies to provide services.
24 6
Legal services plans, however, also present unique preemption problems
stemming from the fact that their terms and conditions, at least indirectly,
are regulated or affected by rules of professional conduct adopted by state
courts and bar associations. Various bar rules "relate to" employee benefit
plans by imposing conditions on cooperation of attorneys with legal serv-
grant tax exemptions for the plans (this has since occurred); second, parties must bargain to
provide funding for plans in the case of collectively bargained plans; and third, the mechan-
ics of delivering legal services must be worked out.
The variety of plans is great. The possibilities can be analyzed according to the providers
of the service (fully open, in which a member may select any lawyer anywhere for legal
services covered; partly open, in which a member may select any lawyer within a geographi-
cal area or from a panel; partly closed, in which a member may select a lawyer from a small
number of lawyers/law firms available to the group; and fully closed, in which only lawyers
on the full-time staff of the plan serve members), the benefits offered (ranging from only
advice, plus possibly some office work, prepaid in full to any and all legal problems with no
exclusions); and the sponsor or administering organization (consumer groups, bar associa-
tions, insurance companies, or others). See Murphy, A Vision of the Future, reprinted as
Appendix F in N. LEVIN, supra note 2, at 441, 444-46.
242. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976). Prepaid legal services plans are those in which a
prepayment or premium is given by a person(s) on their own behalf for provision of special-
ized or scheduled legal services at some future date. Kirby, supra note 238, at 324. Many
group legal services plans are not prepaid, including group consultation and referral plans
(the most common type of existing group legal services plans) which involve: first, agreement
between an organized group of potential clients and one or more attorneys; and second,
some fee consultation with provision of legal services at individual fees based on a predeter-
mined fee schedule that is usually lower than the normal rate. Id.
243. See Feinstein v. Attorney General, 36 N.Y.2d 199, 326 N.E.2d 288, 290, 366
N.Y.S.2d 613 (1975). A recent survey of state insurance departments revealed that in nine
states insurance companies are not permitted to write legal expense insurance. In an addi-
tional seven states, no position has been taken. See DeMent, supra note 239, at 24.
244. See Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 797-98.
245. The preemption problems confronting legal services plans are discussed thoroughly
in Pfenningstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 812-28. In a February 27, 1978 letter to the
Arkansas Insurance Department, the Dept. of Labor stated that a prepaid legal services plan
administered by the National Employee Benefit Program is not covered by ERISA because
the plan does not meet the statutory definitions of employer or employee organization.
BNA PENSION REP., June 12, 1978, at A-5.
246. See Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 812-25.
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ices plans. 247 In fact, the sweeping preemption provision adopted by the
ERISA conference committee was, at least in part, a reaction to the recent
American Bar Association amendments to the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility favoring open panel plans. 248 The preemptive language was
supported by the consumer and labor lobbies, both of which wanted exper-
imental legal services plans to develop in an environment free from exces-
sive regulation.
249
Floor debate on the issue of section 514(a)'s effect on professional codes
shows that Congress intended some, but not complete, preemption of those
rules:
Mr. Javits: Section 514 of the Act does not preempt state bar
associations from adopting and enforcing ethical rules or guide-
lines generally and/or from disciplining its members or acting to
discipline members of the bar, which bar associations often do.
Section 514 does preempt state law with respect to any em-
ployee benefit plan described in Section 4(a) and not exempted in
Section 4(b).
Since plans subject to federal supervision would include plans
providing prepaid legal services, it is intended that state regula-
tion-but not bar association ethical rules, guidelines or discipli-
nary actions-in regard to such plans be preempted. But the
state, directly or indirectly through the bar is preempted from
regulating the form and content of a legal service plan, for exam-
ple, open versus closed panels, in the guise of disciplinary or ethi-
247. The potential preemptive effect on several bar rules is discussed thoroughly in Pfen-
nigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 835-46. Among those rules are ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D) which states: "A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a
person or organization that furnishes, or pays for legal services to others, to promote the use
of his services or those of his partner, or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or
his firm, except as permitted in DR 2-101(B)."
The general rule is followed by exemptions and organizations with which the lawyer may
cooperate without violating the rule. Id.
248. An "open panel" plan is one which is open to participation by all attorneys in a
jurisdiction and in which members choose their own attorney. In contrast, under a "closed
panel" plan the plan administrators select several attorneys to serve members. Closed plans
may use one or more law firms, a list of attorneys, or salaried staff attorneys. The ABA
amended ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 and 2-103 in February
1974 and again, after much controversy over discrimination against closed panel plans, in
February 1975. Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 798 n.62. In addition to the ERISA
preemption problems it generated, the February 1974 vote of the ABA House of Delegates
on those Code sections also created antitrust problems. See, e.g., Broadman, supra note 240,
at 22. See also Meeks, Antitrust Aspects of Legal Services Plans, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 855. Two votes reportedly taken in the conference committee on the specific
issue of whether state law should be preempted as it relates to legal services plans supported
preemption. Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 802 n.71.
249. Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 828-29.
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cal rules or proceedings. 250
That statement was followed by a colloquy between Sentors Javits and
Williams, two of ERISA's floor managers, in which Senator Williams con-
curred in Senator Javits' views on preemption with respect to state regula-
tion of the form or content of prepaid legal services plans.251 The colloquy
recognized a legitimate state interest in regulating the conduct of lawyers
participating in prepaid plans. The sweeping language of section 514(a),
however, is not so accommodating. The courts have not yet been
presented with a case in which the preemption of bar association rules is at
issue. The one reported case involving ERISA's preemption of a state law
regulating legal practice merely noted in dictum that ERISA "may ...
preempt the regulation of union prepaid legal services plans, qua plans,
but does not reach professional licensure and regulation of lawyers, qua
lawyers, who render legal services under the plans. '' 252 To the extent that
a bar association or other rule regulates both employee benefit plans and
the conduct of attorneys, 253 the dictum begs the question. Litigation over
250. 120 CONG. REc. S15758 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974).
251. Mr. Javits: I would just like the Senator from New Jersey to confirm my inter-
pretation. Does the Senator from New Jersey confirm his agreement with my
view?
Mr. Williams: Basically, I do. It, perhaps, could have more amplification as such
rules might affect the substance of the operation of prepaid legal services plans.
Certainly the substance or operation of such plans is preempted and will not be
disturbed by what this colloquy is raising. Am I right on that?
Mr. Javits: That is right.
Mr. Williams: Right now.
This is an area that will not give to bar associations the authority to undo what
we, in Congress, have permitted to be done, that is, giving employers and unions
the freedom to develop and operate legal service plans of their choice.
Mr. Javits: But they have their normal disciplinary functions.
Mr. Williams: Otherwise.
Mr. Javits: That is correct.
Id. at S15758.
252. Feinstein v. Attorney-General, 36 N.Y.2d 199, 205-06, 326 N.E.2d 288, 292, 366
N.Y.S.2d 613, 618 (1975). In Feinstein, a union and a local bar association had been denied
court approval for two prepaid legal services plans. Application of Feinstein, 45 App. Div.
2d 440, 357 N.Y.S. 516 (1974). The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding, inter
alia, that in considering such applications a court should not be concerned with fiscal fore-
casts or actuarial soundness. The court viewed its function in such cases as determining
whether plans were responsible and not fraudulent, and would not become involved in the
open versus closed panel controversy as long as there was no disguised form of solicitation
or barratry involved or unreasonable interference between lawyer and client. 36 N.Y.2d at
204-05, 326 N.E.2d at 291, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 617-18.
253. Pfennigstorf & Kimball emphasize that in such cases of overlap between regulation
of employee benefit plans and regulation of attorney conduct, Congress is not as much over-
riding state regulation of the legal profession as forbidding state regulation of plans affecting
interstate commerce. Thus, Congress is clearly exercising legitimate power. It is quite possi-
ble, however, that the preemption provision may remove obstacles to the development of
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the preemption issue as it affects bar rules may be avoided by Supreme
Court decisions relating to attorney conduct which have invalidated some
of these same rules on other grounds254 and by increased acceptance by
bar associations of the legal services movement.
255
D. Applicability of State Anti-discrimination Statutes to Welfare Plans
In 1945, New York became the first state to enact enforceable fair em-
ployment legislation. 256 By 1963, twenty-eight states and sixty municipali-
ties had passed anti-discrimination laws related to employment. 257 Only
ten states did not have some form of fair employment legislation by
1972.258 The state/local regulation of fair employment practices is a devel-
oping area of the law and one that has been encouraged by the federal
government and the public interest bar alike.259 Some local and state stat-
utes are broader than federal legislation on the subject.
260
legal services plans and at the same time interfere with regulation of the legal profession by
removing disciplinary rules and providing no alternative regulatory framework. Their solu-
tion for limiting the reach of the preemption clause is to read Congress' intention as only
eliminating disciplinary rules dealing with certain issues which were problematic in 1974 or
earlier. They conclude that only artificial and unjustifiable restrictions on legal services
plans were of concern to the Congress which drafted the preemption language. See Pfennig-
storf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 833-35.
254. Eg., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee schedule
invalidated on antitrust grounds).
255. See Broadman, supra note 240, at 24-25.
256. Ch. 118, 1945 N.Y. Laws 457 (codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290 to 301 (McKin-
ney 1972)). Since 1945, many states have patterned their fair employment legislation after
the New York statute. T. KHEEL, GUIDE TO FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 32 (1964).
257. T. KHEEL, supra note 256, at 31.
258. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
ACT OF 1972 at 66 (1973). North Carolina's law was limited to public employment. Al-
though Tennessee and South Dakota have no fair employment practice laws, they have
commissions to promote equal employment opportunity. The state laws vary widely in type
of administration, enforcement and coverage. As of 1972, 41 states (including the District of
Columbia) had some type of legislation outlawing employment discrimination on the basis
of race and religion, see id. at 82-83; 32 states also outlawed age discrimination in employ-
ment, id, at 67-68; and 38 states (including the District of Columbia) prohibited sex discrimi-
nation in employment. Id. at 85-86.
259. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY-RESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS, REMEDIES 5
(J. Pemberton ed., 1975). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission favors such
state and local regulation because it alleviates a portion of the complaint load from the
federal agency. Id.
260. Compare Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)
(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or
religion) with Employment Guidelines for D.C. Human Rights Law (Title 34, D.C. Rules
and Regulations), 22 D.C. Reg. 7025 (1976) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance,
sexual orientation, family reponsibilities, physical handicap, matriculation, or political affili-
ation).
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Under a state fair employment statute, public and private employers
may be required to include coverage of pregnancy within their disability or
other employment welfare plans.261 The Supreme Court, however, has
held that failure of employers to provide disability benefits for pregnancy-
related leave violates neither the equal protection clause nor Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.262 Hence, whether state or federal law gov-
erns has been a crucial question in an action alleging sex discrimination
based on denial of maternity leave benefits.
263
A few of the courts have already considered preemption issues related to
261. Some states expressly prohibit employers from denying employees disabled as a
result of pregnancy any compensation to which they are entitled as a result of the accumula-
tion of benefits under employee plans. See Montana Maternity Leave Act, MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 41-2602 (Supp. 1977). Other state anti-discrimination statutes have been
construed as requiring coverage by benefit plans of pregnancy-related leave. See, e.g.,
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359
N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976). In that case, the state human rights statute (which had
previously been judicially construed as requiring public employers to treat pregnancy the
same as other physical impairments) was held to render "dormant" the New York Disability
Benefits Law (which excepts pregnancy-related disabilities from those disabilities for which
employers must pay workers a portion of their salary for a 26 week period) whenever the
two statutes interact. See BNA PENSION REP., Jan. 3, 1977, at A-18. Other cases construing
state anti-discrimination laws include: Quaker Oats Co. v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights
Comm'n, 268 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1978) (exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from
Iowa employer's disability income plans violates municipal ordinance barring sex discrimi-
nation in employment); Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrim-
ination, 375 N.E.2d 1192 (Mass. 1978) (exclusion of temporary disabilities related to
pregnancy from employer's comprehensive disability plan constituted unlawful sex discrimi-
nation in violation of state anti-discrimination statute); ef Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Depart-
ment of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 68 Wis.2d 345,, 366-67, 228 N.W.2d 649, 661
(1975) (dicta) (sex discrimination may be found if employer has treated temporary disability
due to pregnancy differently from other temporary disabilities).
262. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (denial of maternity leave does not consti-
tute invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause); General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (employers who exclude pregnancy-related disabilities from
otherwise comprehensive disability insurance plans do not violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
Even after the Supreme Court pronouncements in Gilbert and Geduldig, the overwhelm-
ing majority of state courts that have considered whether exclusion of pregnancy-related
disabilities violates state or local anti-discrimination statutes have concluded that it does.
For example in Anderson v. Upper Bucks County Area Vocational Technical School, 30 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 103, 373 A.2d 126 (1977), the court did not feel compelled to construe the state
statute in the same way the Supreme Court construed Title VII in Gilbert. It determined
that a school's refusal to apply a teacher's sick leave to time she was absent from employ-
ment as a result of pregnancy was discriminatory under the Permsylavania Human Rela-
tions Act. See cases cited at note 261 supra. But see Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Rhode Island
Comm'n for Human Rights, 374 A.2d 1022 (1977) (holding that exclusion of pregnancy-
related benefits does not violate state anti-discrimination law).
263. Congress, however, has recently passed Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e), which amends Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on
pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions. 124 CONG REc. H13495 (daily ed. Oct. 14,
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anti-discrimination statutes and most have upheld the state statute in the
face of ERISA's preemption language. 264 In order to sustain the state anti-
discrimination statutes against challenges based on ERISA's section 514,
the courts have generally used two different approaches. The first ap-
proach distinguishes between statutes which are of "peripheral concern" to
ERISA and other statutes. In Time Insurance Co. v. Department of Indus-
try, Labor and Human Relations,265 the state court refused to find ERISA
preemption of a state fair employment law which required employers to
pay disability benefits to pregnant workers on the same basis as temporary
disability benefits were paid to other employees. 266 The court conceded
that the ERISA preemption issue was a close one and acknowledged legis-
lative intent that ERISA preempt a broad range of laws.267 It emphasized,
however, that the Wisconsin Fair Employment Law was not a specialized
statute dealing with a particular aspect of employee benefit plans, but
rather was a broad statute grounded in the state's police powers. 268 Since
the state law was found "in no way to impinge on federal regulation of
employee benefit plans" and therefore was "merely of peripheral concern
1978). Hence, the differences in state and federal law may not be as significant a factor in
future sex discrimination cases.
264. Several reported cases involving preemption of anti-discrimination statutes are from
Wisconsin, and each found no preemption. Buycrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., La-
bor & Human Relations, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1230 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. $ 8163
(Dane County Wis. Cir. Ct.), affid, No. 77-650 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1978); Time Ins. Co. v.
Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 391 (Dane
County Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978). A Montana state court, however, has recently ruled that ERISA
does preempt the Montana Maternity Leave Act. See Mountain State Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Commission of Labor and Indus., No. 41908 (Ist Mont. Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 1978). See
also Gast v. Oregon, 585 P.2d 12 (Ore. Ct. App. 1978).
265. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 391 (Dane County Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978).
266. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31-37 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977-78). An employee of
the insurance company had taken a three-month pregnancy-related leave. Although the
company paid disability benefits to employees who were temporarily unable to work due to
medical disability, it did not include pregnancy within that category. The employee thus
received no disability benefits during her leave. The defendant department directed the
company to pay the complaining employee the same disability benefits for her leave as it
paid to other employees for non-pregnancy-related disabilities. The employer petitioned for
court review of the department's order. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 392.
The Wisconsin State Supreme Court had previously construed the state statute as requir-
ing that pregnancy-related disabilities be treated the same as other disabilities. See Ray-O-
Vac, Div. of E.S.B., Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 70 Wis. 2d
919, 236 N.W.2d 209 (1975); Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 68 Wis. 2d 345, 228 N.W.2d 649, (1975).
267. Time Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 16 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 391, 395 (Dane County Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978).
268. Id. at 396.
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to ERISA," it was sustained. 269 The peripheral concern test adopted by
the court in Time Insurance has been followed by at least one other court
considering ERISA preemption in the context of other types of state stat-
utes.27
0
In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations,27' another Wisconsin state court rejected the peripheral
concern test and instead relied on ERISA's nonimpairment clause, section
514(d), to uphold the same state anti-discrimination statutes.272 Once
again, the issue involved coverage of pregnancy-related disabilities. The
court read section 514(d) as saving not only federal statutes, such as Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,273 but also any state and local statutes
preserved by non-ERISA federal legislation.274 The court saw no conflict
between this interpretation of section 514(d) and the congressional goals of
eliminating potentially inconsistent state regulation and developing a body
269. Id. Judge Currie refused to displace the state statute "[u]ntil the United States
Supreme Court rules to the contrary" and as long as there "exists a rational doubt that
preemption exists." Id.
270. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313
(9th Cir. June 21, 1978), took this approach with respect to preemption of community prop-
erty laws. See text accompanying notes 129-31 supra.
271. 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. $ 8163 (Dane County Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978), afl'd, No. 77-650
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1978). Goodyear Tire provided its employees with weekly disability
benefits for the duration of a disability, up to 52 weeks. Pregnancy-related disabilities, how-
ever, were limited to only six weeks for each pregnancy. The state Department of Industry,
Labor, and Human Relations ordered the company to cease and desist its policy pending a
determination as to whether the policy of treating pregnancy-related disabilities differently
from other disabilities constituted sex discrimination. Goodyear contested the order in state
court. Id. at 4796-97, 4801.
272. Section 514(d) of ERISA provides that the 1974 Act shall not be construed to super-
sede other federal laws, with minor exceptions irrelevant to this discussion. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(d) (1976).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
274. Deference to state and local fair employment statutes is built into Title VII. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and -5(d) (1976). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 states:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
any liability, duty, penalty or punishment provided by any present or future law of
any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which pur-
ports to require or permit the doing of an act which would be unlawful employ-
ment practice under this subehapter.
The court distinguished Azzaro v. Harnett, 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
824 (1978), Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108
(1978), and Wayne Chem. Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1977), on the fact that none of those cases involved a federal statute co-existing with ERISA.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 16 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 8163 at 4801 (Dane County Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978). Accord, Bucyrus-Erie Co. v.
Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 130, 132-33
(E.D. Wis. 1978); Lukus v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. 6D 77-14803 (Pa. Ct. Common
Pleas Apr. 20, 1978), BNA PENSION REP., May 29, 1978, at D-l, D-2 to D-3.
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of substantive federal law. Rather, the court viewed ERISA as responsive
to employer and union abuses of employee benefit plans but silent on the
issue of sex discrimination.
275
Nevertheless, the section 514(d) approach and reasoning used in
Goodyear to except a state fair employment statute from ERISA preemp-
tion has been rejected on the floor of the Senate:
Mr. Javits:. . . [I]t is understood that just as these age discrim-
ination amendments do not interfere with ERISA, State age dis-
crimination in employment laws are not to interfere with ERISA.
The ADEA itself. . . does not preempt such State age discrimi-
nation laws. However, there should be no question that the pre-
emption rules of § 514(a) of ERISA shall be determinative
regarding the preemption of State age discrimination laws which
directly or indirectly establish requirements relating to employee
benefit plans. ERISA's preemption of State age discrimination
laws shall be determined without regard to § 514(d) of ERISA or
thefact that the ADEA does not itsefYpreempt State Law.
Mr. Williams: I concur. . . . Federal Law will preempt State
age discrimination statutes only to the extent that those laws re-
late to an employee benefit plan described in 4(a) of ERISA and
are not exempt under 4(b) of ERISA.
276
The Goodyear approach has also been rejected by a Montana court.
Finding congressional statements and debates of relatively low value as
tools for statutory construction, the First Montana Judicial District Court
in Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Commissioner of Indus-
try and Labor277 used another approach to discount the reasoning in
Goodyear. The court relied on the enacted language set forth in the
ERISA findings and declaration of policy278 to conclude that Congress'
intention to occupy the entire field of employee benefit plan regulation was
unmistakable.2
79
ERISA's preemption of state anti-discrimination laws could involve
pension plans as well as welfare plans. For example, if a state age discrim-
275. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations,
16 Emp. Prac. Dec. 1 8163 at 4801 (Dane County Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978), a 'd, No. 78-2313
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1978).
276. 124 CONG. REC. S4450 (daily ed. March 23, 1978) (debate on Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Amendments of 1978) (emphasis added).
277. No. 41908 (1st Mont. Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 1978).
278. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
279. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commissioner of Indus. & Labor, No. 41908,
slip op. at 4-5 (1st Mont. Jud. Dist. Ct., Aug. 14, 1978). At least one federal court agrees with
the Montana view. See Pervel Indus. Inc. v. Connecticut Comm'r of Human Rights and
Opportunities, 47 U.S.L.W. 2331 (D. Conn. Oct. 16, 1978).
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ination statute like California's280 contains no upper age limit for protec-
tion of employees, could a pension plan in that state provide for
mandatory retirement at age seventy (the new upper limit for private sec-
tor and state employees under the federal Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act 281)? And, if a state age discrimination statute contains no
exemption for bona fide employee benefit plans, may it require pension
benefit accruals after the pension plan's normal retirement age, even
though the federal age discrimination act would allow the plan to freeze
accruals at that point?
282
V. OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH ERISA PREEMPTION
There is wide disagreement on whether ERISA's preemption provision
should be clarified or revised. Similarly, among those favoring revision of
the section 514 language, there is no consensus on whether the change
should broaden or restrict section 514's effect on state regulation.
28 3
Four amendments were introduced during the Ninety-fifth Congress re-
lating to ERISA's preemption provisions. Two congressional members
from Hawaii introduced bills to specifically overrule the Agsalud284 deci-
sion by excluding from ERISA's reach employee benefit plans maintained
for the purpose of complying with state health insurance laws. 285 Another
280. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
281. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
256, § 3, 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 622a).
282. See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16 (1978), reprinted in, [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 976, 988-91; 124 CONG. REC. S4450 (daily ed. March 23, 1978)
(remarks of Senators Javits and Williams); Department of Labor Proposed Amendment to
Interpretive Bulletin on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended by
43 FED. REG. 43,264 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 860). Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976),
as amended by, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2, 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (discriminatory acts pursuant to
bona fide retirement plan legal).
283. Compare 1978 Oversight Hearings, supra note 27, at 535 (statement of ERISA In-
dustry Committee (ERIC)) (supporting present broad preemptive effect) with ACTIVITY RE-
PORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 1785, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 46-49 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 94-1785] (recommending
adherence to and strengthening of ERISA's broad preemption) and 1978 Oversight Hearings,
supra note 27, at 650 (statement of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC)) (recommending amendments to minimize preemption).
284. Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), ap-
peal docketed, No. 78-1095 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1978). In the Agsalud case, the Hawaiian
health care law was found preempted by ERISA. See text accompanying notes 214-24
supra. The Hawaiian amendment would not overrule Hewlett Packard, see text accompa-
nying notes 143-51 supra; nor would it sustain Wadsworth, see text accompanying notes
190-201 supra.
285. S. 1383, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced on April 26, 1977 by Sen. Inouye)
and H.R. 6944, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced on May 5, 1977 by Rep. Heftel)
would have revised 29 U.S.C. § 1003 to read as follows:
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amendment, S. 2018, contained language restricting preemption of state
law relating to welfare benefit plans to instances in which such plans are
actually subject to ERISA. 286 The fourth proposed amendment to ERISA
addressed section 206(d)(1) and the conflict between ERISA's prohibition
against assignment or alienation of pension benefits and state court decrees
of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support.287 This amendment
would have permitted pension benefit attachment by court order for family
support. 288 None of the proposed amendments generated noticeable sup-
port from concerned interest groups. In the Ninty-sixth Congress, one bill
attempts to balance the federal and state interests in the various aspects of
employee benefit plans. The bill, S. 209, specifically deals with state stat-
(b) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit
plan if-
(3) maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's
compensation laws, or unemployment compensation laws or disability or health
insurance laws.
286. S. 2018, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Sen. Curtis on August 4, 1977)
provided:
That § 514(b) of [ERISA] is amended by-
(I) inserting "pension" after "employee" in paragraph (2)(B), and
(2) adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
(5) Subsection (a) shall not apply to an employee welfare benefit plan to
the extent such plan is not subject to the provisions of this title and title IV.
A similar modification was urged by NAIC during oversight hearings held by the House
Committee on Labor Standards. See 1978 Oversight Hearings, supra note 27. As NAIC
noted, this change retains federal occupation of the pension plan field, but narrows preclu-
sion of state law regulating employee welfare plans to those matters addressed by the federal
statute. For a discussion of this approach, see notes 305-09 and accompanying text infra.
287. See text accompanying notes 107-35 supra.
288. H.R. 13446, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (introduced by Rep. Seiberling on July 12,
1978) provided:
(b) Subsection (d) of section 206 of [ERISA] is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new paragraph:
(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any assignment or alienation of benefits
under the plan if-
(A) Such assignment or alienation is pursuant to a decree of divorce or sep-
arate maintenance, or any other order of a court which requires an individual to
contribute to the support of his children;
(B) Such decree or order does not affect the time when benefits are payable
under the plan, and
(C) A copy of such decree or order is submitted to the Secretary at such
time and in such manner as he may by regulations prescribe.
The Seiberling bill would have also amended the Internal Revenue Code to permit such
assignments by qualified plans without adverse tax consequences. See 124 CONG. REC.
E3760-61 (daily ed. July 14, 1978). Representative Seiberling reintroduced his amendment
in the 96th Congress as H.R. 1884. 125 CONG. REc. H456 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1979).
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utes related to health care, insurance, and marital property and support.289
Regardless how precisely a federal law is drafted, there will always be
problems surrounding preemption of state law by the federal statute.
Nonetheless, ERISA's language on the subject can be improved. As previ-
ously discussed, the case law to date has yielded conflicting interpretations
of the 1974 statute's preemptive effect. These varying interpretations have
resulted in confusion for plan administrators, state officials, and numerous
other parties affected by the Act. Accordingly, it may be desirable to clar-
ify ERISA's preemption provision through legislation. The available al-
ternatives can be classified into several general categories: (1) minimize
the state role in regulating employee benefit plans; (2) allow the states
some role in regulating the employee benefit plan field; or (3) postpone the
decision of how to amend ERISA pending further study.
4. Minimizing the State Role
After several year's experience under ERISA, the House Committee on
Education and Labor reiterated its judgment that ERISA's legislative
scheme leaves "no room for effective state regulation" within the
preempted field of employee benefit plans. 290 The Committee also reaf-
firmed the belief that federal interest in the field and "the need for uni-
formity are so great that the enforcement of state regulation should be
289. S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (introduced by Senators Williams and Javits on
January 24, 1979). The bill saves from preemption the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Law (as
in effect on January 1, 1979) as well as any other state law the Secretary of Labor deter-
mines: 1) to be substantially identical to the Hawaii law; and 2) to require benefits that are
substantially identical in type and amount to those required or permitted by the Hawaii
statute. The bill's saving of Hawaii-type statutes would not, however, include those provi-
sions which the Secretary of Labor determines to be similar to ERISA's reporting and dis-
closure, fiduciary, and enforcement provisions. The effect of such a proposal essentially
would be to overrule Agsalud and Heaton while affirming Hewlett-Packard.
S. 209 also contains a provision overruling Wadsworth by holding that state laws requir-
ing provision of specific benefits in insurance policies or contracts are preempted insofar as
they relate to employee benefit plans. The bill, however, does save state insurance laws that
give plan participants the option of purchasing policies issued to a plan should the plan
terminate.
With regard to state marital property and support laws, S. 209 would save from preemp-
tion judgments, decrees and orders (including approvals of property settlement agreements)
pursuant to state common law or community property domestic relations laws which: 1)
affect either marital property rights to pension benefits or legal obligations to provide child
support or alimony payments; and 2) do not require a pension plan to alter the effective date,
timing, form, duration, or amount of payments under the plan or to honor elections pro-
vided under the plan which is made by a person other than a participant or beneficiary. The
bill also precludes application of ERISA's anti-assignment and alienation of benefits rule to
such judgments, decrees, or orders.
290. H.R. REP. No. 94-1785, supra note 283, at 47.
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precluded. ' 291 The Committee, however, suggested that some refinement
to limit the exceptions to the preemption provision might be in order.
292
Several changes, or a combination of changes, could implement this rec-
ommendation. Parts (a) and (c) of section 514 could be reworded to elimi-
nate any doubt that state regulation affecting employee benefit plans is
precluded, except as specified in section 514(b)(1). The revised sections
would resemble the following:
514(a). . . the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
directl or indirectl relate, affect, or impact upon any employee
benefit plan ....
514(c)
(3) The salutary effect and equitable principles behind the State
law as well as the degree of conflict between the State law and
this enactment shall be immaterial to the determination of fed-
eral supersession of State law.
The major advantage of the foregoing changes is the degree of certainty
and uniformity they would establish. Any state law which even tangen-
tially touched employee benefit plans would be preempted.293 Rules of
conduct regulating lawyers but also affecting prepaid legal services plans
would likewise be preempted.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, however, certain gaps exist in the
federal regulatory scheme, and absolute preemption could permit plan
abuses to grow in a regulatory vacuum.294 For example, ERISA does not
291. Id. at 47.
292. The Committee was particularly concerned with efforts to construe the deemer
clause so that plans which contain characteristics of insurance remain subject to state regula-
tion. The Committee stated that the deemer clause was intended as an "irrebuttable pre-
sumption" that such plans are not insurance. The irrebuttable presumption would not be
overcome even if the plan engages in activities generally regulated by the state. Id. at 47.
Another Committee concern was the construction narrowing § 514 by reading the phrase
"terms and conditions" of § 514(c) into § 514(a). See, e.g., Brummond, supra note 20, at 97-
122. In the Committee's view, such a restrictive construction is unwarranted. See H.R. REP.
No. 94-1785, supra note 283, at 47-48. The Committee also mentioned the MET problem,
see text accompanying notes 163-89 supra, but noted that such plans fail to meet the defini-
tion of "employee benefit plan" in 29 U.S.C. § 1003(3) and thus continue to be subject to
state regulation. H.R. REP. 94-1785, supra note 283, at 48-49.
293. Thus, the proposed amendment would overrule those cases which used peripheral
impact as a reason for saving state laws. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21, 1978); Time Ins. Co. v. Depart-
ment of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 391 (Dane County Wis.
Cir. Ct. 1978), af'd, No. 77-650 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1978) (using the peripheral impact
test to exclude state community property and anti-discrimination statutes, respectively, from
ERISA's preemptive effect).
294. Pfennigstorf & Kimball have outlined two major regulatory omissions from ERISA.
First, the federal statute does not provide for regular examinations of employee benefit
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contain minimum standards for welfare plans. The statute is less con-
cerned with the nature and funding of welfare plans than with their pru-
dent administration. If parts (a) or (c) of section 514 were rewritten, the
establishment of federal welfare plan standards to fill this regulatory void
would be desirable. For example, protections like those of California's
Knox-Keene Act could be placed in the federal statute.295 In addition,
passage of national health insurance would help allay concerns stemming
from decisions like Agsalud, which upheld displacement of Hawaii's stat-
ute mandating health insurance coverage of employees in the state.
296
Broad preemption also can be accomplished by specifically preempting
those types of state laws which have proven troublesome. Under this ap-
proach, a new preemption provision could be substituted for section
514(a), which would retain the existing provision in section 514(a)(1) and
add a new section-514(a)(2)-providing:
(2) State laws relating to employee benefit plans which are su-
perseded shall include but shall not be limited to the following:
fair employment laws; marital property and support laws; escheat
laws; tax laws; health care service laws, whether or not insurance
is involved; and codes of professional conduct.
In addition to the problems inherent in rewriting sections 514(a) or (c),
however, this option could be criticized for eliminating confusion only in
those areas now known to be problematic. Just as Congress apparently
failed to foresee present problem areas, this option would not deal with
state and federal conflicts relating to employee benefit plans which will
undoubtedly surface in the future. Hence, any amendment attempting to,
proscribe specific state statutes can only amount to a piecemeal approach,
one which likely will necessitate further revisions. It should be added that
any attempt to minimize the state regulatory role in the employee benefit
plan field also should be accompanied by clear legislative language as to
the role of the courts in developing federal common law to fill in the statu-
tory gaps.
2 9 7
plans. The Secretary of Labor, under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1134(a) (1976), has power to conduct
unlimited investigations only with reasonable cause to believe there has been a violation.
Secondly, enforcement powers and procedures are inadequate to control over one and a half
million employee benefit plans. See Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 842-43.
295. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340 to 1345 (West Cum. Supp. 1971-77). See
note 145 supra and accompanying text.
296. See H.R. 21/S. 3, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Compare the Corman-Kennedy pro-
posal for National Health Insurance, (which provides for comprehensive benefits, universal
eligibility, modification of organization, and delivery of services and mandatory coverage)
with the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-51 (1976),
successfully challenged in Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
appeal docketed, No. 78-1095 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1978).
297. The importance of the courts' function in fashioning a uniform federal common law
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Alternatively, the Secretary of Labor or his delegate, rather than the
trial courts, could be designated to decide whether a particular statute is
preempted under ERISA.298 The major advantage of this transfer of re-
sponsibility would be the uniformity of decision-making achieved. Rather
than hundreds of judges making determinations about ERISA's preemp-
tion of state statutes, Labor Department officials, with their specialized ex-
pertise, would be responsible for the decision-making. On the other hand,
although those federal officials making the determination would perhaps
be more familiar with the operation of pension and welfare plans, they
may be less familiar with the workings of a particular state law and less
cognizant of the effects of preemption. Moreover, it could be argued that
the Department of Labor does not have sufficient staff resources to handle
this added responsibility. Given the Department's current difficulty in en-
forcing the existing provisions of ERISA and the problems inherent in de-
veloping necessary regulations,299 a solution providing an exclusively
administrative determination could be impractical. As with the other al-
ternatives stressing broad preemption, this option would lead to a regula-
tory vacuum each time the Department of Labor found a particular statute
preempted. The Department, unlike the courts, however, could not create
a "federal common law" to fill the gap unless Congress explicitly vested it
with that authority.
It may be desirable to combine any broad preemption amendment with
provisions aimed at multiple employer trusts. One alternative would be to
both affirm broad preemption and amend ERISA's coverage provisions to
include all METs as well as provide minimum standards for such entities.
The expertise and enforcement machinery at the state level in addition to
the Labor Department's staff limitations argue, however, against exclusive
federal regulation of METs.
As the Activity Report of the House Committee on Education and La-
bor noted, certain entrepreneurs marketing insurance products to employ-
ers and employees are claiming erroneously that the packages are ERISA-
covered plans.3°° The claims of such entrepreneurs are aided by the ambi-
and the role of state law in the process are discussed in the district court's decision in Wayne
Chem. Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316, 325 (N.D. Ind.), a f'd as
modfed, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
298. Although this alternative is included under options for broad preemption, it could
also be used to permit selective state regulation.
299. See Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 7, at 850.
300. H.R. REP. 94-1785, supra note 283 at 48. The report concluded that such plans are
not employee benefit plans as defined by ERISA because: 1) they are established and main-
tained by entrepreneurs for marketing insurance products/services to others; 2) they are not
established or maintained by the appropriate parties to result in ERISA coverage; 3) the
purpose of the plans' establishment is insufficient to meet ERISA jurisdictional require-
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guity of existing definitions of "employee organization" 30 and "employee
beneficiary association" in ERISA.30 2 Between January 1, 1975, and June
1, 1978, twenty-eight suits against uninsured METs were filed.30 3 The liti-
gation is expensive and time-consuming for state insurance commissioners.
However, the commissioners ultimately have been successful since courts
have uniformly upheld state regulation of METs.30 4 It may be desirable to
specify that METs which are employee benefit plans are protected from
state insurance regulation and to provide guidance in determining which
METs are covered by ERISA. Such an approach, of course, would pre-
serve some state regulation of METs but, in light of the Department of
Labor's staff limitations, this would be reasonable even under a broad pre-
emptive scheme.
B. Provision for Some State Role in the Regulation
of Employee Beneft Plans
There are numerous ways to amend section 514 in order to provide for
varying degrees of state regulation of employee benefit plans. Some of
these approaches have been used in the amendments introduced in the
Ninety-fifth and Ninety-sixth Congresses.
As many have noted, the primary emphasis of ERISA's drafters con-
cerned pension plans. 30 5 Accordingly, ERISA is more detailed in its regu-
lation of pension plans than welfare plans. This emphasis argues in favor
of a two-pronged approach to preemption: reaffirming broad preemption
ments; and 4) the plans are no more ERISA plans than are any other insurance policies sold
to employee benefit plans. Id.
301. See 1978 Oversight Hearings, supra note 27, at 652-53. The definitions are both
overbroad and circular in nature. Id. See also Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437
F. Supp. 382, 394 (D. Kan. 1977), discussed in notes 173-189 and accompanying text supra.
Employee organization is defined as:
any labor union or any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee repre-
sentation committee, association, group, or plan, in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning an employee benefit plan, or other matters incidental to employment
relationships or any employees' beneficiary association organized for the purpose
...of establishing such a plan.
ERISA § 3(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(4) (1976). However, an employee benefit plan is defined in
ERISA § 3(1) in terms of who provides it. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976) "Thus a plan is an
employee benefit plan if it meets certain requirements and is provided by an employee or-
ganization. An entity is an employee organization if it is organized to provide an employee
benefit plan." 437 F. Supp. at 394.
302. 1978 Oversight Hearings, supra note 27, at 653 (statement of National Association of
Insurance Commissioners) (NAIC).
303. Id. at 661.
304. See notes 163-89 and accompanying text supra.
305. See Brummond, supra note 20, at 126.
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regarding pension plans but limiting preemption of state laws relating to
welfare plans. There are several ways to implement this two-pronged ap-
proach. One is to preempt all pension-related state statutes and only those
state welfare plan statutes that relate to matters covered by ERISA.
3°6
Under this approach, however, welfare plans would be subject to a vari-
ety of state laws regulating plan content (Wadsworth type307) and coverage
(Agsalud type308). For example, a participant in a multistate plan who
306. Not surprisingly, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has
called for broad preemption of pension plan-related state laws but for exception from pre-
emption for all welfare plan related state laws which do not conflict with ERISA. Under its
proposal, NAIC also recommended the following changes to the definition of an "employee
welfare benefit plan":
3(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any
plan, fund, or program:
(A) which is established or maintained-
(i) by a single employer, an employee organization, or both; or
(ii) by a controlled group of corporations as defined in title 26, section
1563(a) of this code which function as a common control employer;,
or
(iii) as a 'nulti-employer plan" within the meaning of section 1002(37) of
this tide, and
(B) which provides [was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee or organization, or by both, to the extent
that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the
purpose of providing] for its participants on their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise.
(i) [(A)] medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or un-
employment, [sic] vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training
programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services, or
(ii) [(B)] any benefit described in section 302(c) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947 (other than pensions on retirement
or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
1978 Oversight Hearings, supra note 27 at 673-74 (statement of NAIC). NAIC proposes
similar changes in the definition of pension plans. Id., at 674-75. The Association also
recommends refinements of the definition of employer and employee organization. Id. at
675.
NAIC's preemption recommendations also appear in Brummond, supra note 20, at 125.
Brummond also offers a variation on the proposed revision of § 514(a) to eliminate the pre-
emption of state laws relating to employee welfare benefit plans altogether. Id. at 124.
At least one state has called on Congress to adopt limited preemption of welfare plans. In
a joint resolution, the California State Legislature urged Congress to amend ERISA to pre-
empt state laws relating to welfare plans only to the extent that they conflict with ERISA.
The resolution also called on Congress to clarify the definition of multiple employer trusts.
See S.J. Res. No. 43, Cal. Gen. Ass., 1978 Sess., reprinted in 1978 Oversight Hearings, supra
note 27, at 1303. Limited preemption was a feature of one of the bills introduced into the
95th Congress to amend ERISA. S. 2018, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See note 286 supra.
307. See text accompanying notes 191-200 supra.
308.. See note 215 supra.
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lives in New Hampshire, where mental health benefits are mandated pur-
suant to state law for group insurance contracts, probably would not re-
ceive vision and dental coverage because the fund would have to
discontinue these benefits to provide statutorily required benefits. If a par-
ticipant in the same plan moved to Maine, however, he or she could re-
ceive vision and dental coverage, but might have to forego mental health
coverage. 30 9 It was congressional concern with the problems emerging
from conflicting state regulation of interstate plans which in part led to the
adoption of the present preemption language. 310 In addition, problems
could arise in deciding what welfare plan matters were not covered by
ERISA and therefore subject to state regulation.
One way to minimize preemption of state laws while minimizing
problems for interstate employee welfare plans is to preempt only state
laws relating to interstate plans. Under this approach, it would probably
be necessary to define an "interstate" plan as one which has participants in
more than one state. Effectively, this approach would not preempt state
laws relating to intrastate welfare plans. This dichotomy of state/federal
jurisdiction depending on the interstate nature of a plan, however, could
lead to situations in which neither the state nor the federal government
would regulate a particular plan, each assuming the other had jurisdiction.
Periodic reporting on the intra/interstate character of plans would be nec-
essary. This scheme also would leave open the possibility that a plan could
become subject to different standards overnight if it changed from intra-
state to interstate and vice versa. The dual regulation scheme thus might
prove unpredictable for both plan participants and administrators.
The original House and Senate versions of ERISA would have pre-
empted only those subject areas covered by ERISA. 31' On its face, this
approach treats pension and welfare plans alike. Its effect, however, would
be to preempt more state laws relating to pension plans since these are
more extensively covered by the Act. Under this method, for example,
states would be prohibited from enacting laws requiring reporting and dis-
closure by either type of employee benefit plan since this is specifically
addressed in the Federal statute. States could, however, enact and enforce
welfare plan laws concerning content of group health plans, pregnancy
coverage in disability plans or lawyers' conduct vis'a vis prepaid legal serv-
ices plans.
Another method for narrowing the scope of ERISA preemption and per-
mitting some state regulation calls for amending section 514(a) to preempt
309. See 1978 Oversight Hearings, supra note 27, at 545.
310. Id.
311. See note 22 supra.
[Vol. 28:163
Preemption Under ERISA
state laws affecting plan form, content, terms, or conditions.31 2 This
change would help eliminate some of the current ambiguity and guard
against the imposition of inconsistent state standards in those important
areas. Under this revision, a professional code rule which discouraged
closed panel legal service plans would be invalidated because of the rela-
tionship between rule content and the terms of the plan. There would be
little doubt, however, that other professional rules not affecting the form,
content, terms, and conditions of plans would not be preempted. Simi-
larly, state anti-discrimination statutes requiring pregnancy benefits would
be preempted as would the statutory sections challenged in Agsalud and
Wadsworth. California's Knox-Keene Act would likely be enforceable.
Building on the approach taken in Stone v. Stone313 and Time Insurance
Co. ,314 Congress could amend section 514(a) to preempt state laws which
relate substantially and directly to employee benefit plans. Although this
approach may present an attractive and flexible solution permitting a size-
able amount of state regulation now thought to be preempted, a close ex-
amination reveals several defects. For example, courts would be required
to interpret the terms "substantial" and "direct," thus increasing the likeli-
hood of conflicting constructions. State court orders awarding the em-
ployee's benefits to the nonemployee spouse arguably are substantially and
directly related to employee benefit plans, yet the test has essentially been
used to exclude community property laws from preemption. 315 This
amendment effectively would overrule only Heaton316 and leave standing
Hewlett-Packard,317 and Agsalud.318
312. The revised language might read as follows:
(a) . . . the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter directly or indirectly relate, affect or im-
pact upon the form, content, terms, or conditions of any employee beneft plan or
reporting and disclosure with respect to such matters ....
313. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir. June 21,
1978).
314. Time Ins. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 16 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 391 (Dane County Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978).
315. See Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313
(9th Cir. June 21, 1978); and notes 125-34 and accompanying text supra.
316. Insurer's Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976) (Minne-
sota's Comprehensive Health Insurance Act requiring employee benefit plans to offer speci-
fied forms of group health coverage held not preempted by ERISA). See notes 202-11 and
accompanying text supra.
317. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108
(1978) (Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act cannot be applied directly to ERISA-
covered employee benefit plans). See notes 202-11 and accompanying text supra.
318. Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), appeal docketed,
No. 78-1095 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1978). (Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act, requiring
mandatory coverage of all injuries, disabling or not, held preempted by ERISA).
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A final alternative for allowing some state role in regulating employee
benefit plans would amend ERISA to deal with identifiable areas in which
preemption problems have arisen. Most of the preemption litigation to
date has been limited to legislation governing the operation or content of
health care service plans, anti-discrimination statutes, and marital property
laws. The two Hawaiian proposals were designed to prevent preemption
of state health care service legislation.319 Congressman Seiberling's pro-
posed amendment dealt exclusively with the preemption problems related
to domestic relations laws.320 Commentators and courts alike have put
forth compelling arguments why Congress should not include marital
property laws within the reach of section 514(a).321 Instead of forcing
courts to invent legal fictions for justifying the nonapplicability of preemp-
tion to domestic relations laws, Congress could deal with the problem spe-
cifically and add such laws to section 514(b)(1)'s list of exceptions.
Similarly, should the policy and practical reasons for excluding anti-dis-
crimination laws from those which are preempted be found equally per-
suasive, they, too, could be added to section 514(b)(1). With regard to
state bar rules, a qualified exception might be provided.
322
In the area of health care laws, several options are available: first, legis-
lation could affirm Hewlett-Packard and Agsalud while overruling Heaton
and Wadsworth by providing that health care legislation, including insur-
ance legislation, is preempted; second, legislation could affirm Hewlett-
Packard, Agsalud, and Wadsworth but overrule Heaton by retaining the
indirect/direct impact test with respect to preemption of state health care
legislation; third, legislation could, as one of the Hawaiian bills 323 does,
overrule Agsalud while leaving Wadsworth and Heaton unchanged;
fourth, legislation could save statutes like those regulating plan funding
and disclosure in Hewlett-Packard, or mandating coverage of workers, in-
clusion of specific disabilities, or specific types of plans as in Agsalud,
Wadsworth, and Heaton.
Dealing separately with each area of state/federal conflict would subject
plans to nonuniform standards in a minimum of plan-related areas and
only when state regulation is deemed preferable. The approach is tailored
to those problems encountered to date and not to hypothetical problems.
319. S. 1383 & H.R. 6944, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); see note 285 supra.
320. H.R. 13446, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); see note 288 supra.
321. See Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2313
(9th Cir. June 21, 1978) and notes 123-26 supra.
322. Bar rules related to the form, content or operation of employee benefit plans might
be preempted while other disciplinary measures would remain under local control.
323. S. 1383, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See note 285 supra.
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Moreover, the approach permits Congress to treat the various problematic
types of state regulation differently for preemption purposes.
A major disadvantage of this approach, of course, is its limited scope.
There is no assurance that Congress will not be back at the drawing board
in several years to deal with new problem areas. Also, gradual granting of
exceptions to ERISA's preemption provision arguably flies in the face of
congressional intent in 1974.
C Postponing the Decision
Another alternative for dealing with ERISA's preemption difficulties
would be to avoid any final solution. ERISA established a Joint Pension
Task Force and ordered it to study the preemption problem.324 No report
has been produced by that congressional task force, and it does not appear
likely that such a report will be issued in the near future. It may be time to
admit that the task force is not the appropriate group to conduct such a
study and that the Department of Labor or another body should be di-
rected by Congress to study the problem and make recommendations.
This approach would have the obvious drawback of continuing the con-
fused situation which now exists.
On the other hand, further study of the problem may be justified be-
cause the case law on preemption is by no means fully developed. Most of
the decisions have dealt with laws related to state regulation of health care
service plans.325 There are few decisions squarely facing ERISA preemp-
tion of state anti-discrimination statutes, and the cases are almost all re-
lated to welfare plans and sex discrimination. Additional cases are
pending in this important area as well as in other areas involving ERISA
preemption, and new cases are being decided on the ERISA preemption
issue with great frequency.
The Supreme Court has yet to rule squarely on the scope of ERISA
preemption, 326 and arguably any legislative change should await judicial
construction by the Court. Those who criticize the present preemption
scheme note that it was hastily devised. That criticism could also be aimed
at amendments adopted without in-depth study of the many facets of the
324. ERISA § 3021, 29 U.S.C. § 1221 (1976).
325. See text accompanying notes 136-224 supra.
326. In dicta, the Court has said, "ERISA ... expressly preempts all state laws regulat-
ing covered plans." Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 2725 n.21 (1978).
The Minnesota Act at issue in Allied was the same statute considered by the Supreme Court
in Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978). In Malone the Court found ERISA
inapplicable because the events at issue transpired prior to ERISA's effective date. How-
ever, the court acknowledged ERISA's comprehensive federal regulation of pension plans
and its express preemption of "all state laws regulating covered plans." Id. at 487 n. 1.
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conflicts between ERISA and various state laws. For these reasons, one
could argue for appointment of a group to replace the originally-mandated
congressional task force. Congress could direct the Department of Labor
to assist the group's study of the problems caused by the current language,
possible solutions, and their potential effect on a wide range of state laws.
The group could be required to report back to Congress at set intervals
and to consult with state officials and interest groups familiar with the ef-
fected laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
The basic question ERISA preemption poses is what role states should
play in the regulation of employee benefit plans. By enacting ERISA's
broad preemption provision, Congress decided that the states' role should
be limited. In reaching this conclusion, Congress apparently acted without
full knowledge of the implications of its choice. Had Congress been aware
of the long reach of the preemption provision, it might have framed section
514 of ERISA differently. The courts have generally made fairminded at-
tempts to do justice in determining the outer limits of federal preemption.
Although not entirely clear and consistent, the case law as a whole has
given ERISA preemption a scope less sweeping than the statutory lan-
guage and legislative history arguably support.
As Congress readdresses the ERISA preemption question, it will have a
choice between reaffirming broad preemption or giving the states an ex-
panded role in employee benefit plan regulation. Each of the options pre-
viously discussed for implementing these two basic alternatives has
advantages and disadvantages. No solution is ideal. Reaffirmation of
broad preemption would, for example, encourage uniformity of regulation
but could result in reduced protection of plan participants and benefi-
ciaries by entirely removing the states from the regulatory scheme.
In deciding which path to follow, Congress should ascertain the federal
and state interests in regulating the various aspects of employee benefit
plans and decide which interest predominates. The respective interests
and their importance will vary, depending upon the plan aspect involved.
For example, the state interest in promoting effective health care service
plans is of course different from the state interest in assuring that its mar-
ried citizens and their children are provided for upon divorce or desertion.
The federal interest, which includes the uniform regulation of plans,
should be weighed against each of these state interests. The balancing
process should take into account additional pertinent factors such as the
possibility of national health insurance and the fact that few states have
engaged in the social experimentation of Hawaii, California and Minne-
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sota with respect to health care plans, whereas all states have long estab-
lished domestic relations laws.
"Big business" and "big labor" generally support broad federal preemp-
tion under ERISA and can be expected to pressure Congress to reaffirm
the breadth of section 514. However, these groups likely will oppose ef-
forts to combine broad preemption with the establishment of new federal
standards aimed at plugging the present regulatory gap with respect to
welfare plans. Thus, while it may be conceptually appealing both to reaf-
firm federal preemption and to adopt federal substantive standards for
welfare plans, it may not be politically feasible to do so. Representatives
of states like Hawaii and California can be expected to oppose reaffirma-
tion of broad preemption in so far as those states' new health care statutes
would be superseded. The fact, however, that few other states have such
statutes will undercut the political force behind this anti-preemption posi-
tion, although there will likely be strong sympathy for the efforts of these
states to better protect their citizens. Another political force which will
affect congressional decisionmaking on the issue of ERISA's preemption
of marital property and support laws will be women's groups which view
such state regulation as necessary protection.
Congress has begun to confront some of the difficult questions raised by
implementation of section 514 of ERISA, and, as the House and Senate
proceed, the practical solutions will not be found without debate and disa-
greement. Further development of the case law will assist in sharpening
the ERISA preemption issues, as will further study and administrative in-
terpretation. Whether Congress will successfully harmonize the counter-
vailing policy concerns at the heart of ERISA preemption remains to be
seen.
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